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RETHINKING THE JURY
Phoebe A. Haddon*
"In the ideal world perhaps we'd like most decisions to be made by
juries.
I. INTRODUCTION
The civil jury2 has often been cast as the quintessential democratic
institution, but its practical value in promoting justice has also been
questioned.3 A metaphor for citizen participation in legal decision-making,
the modem civil jury enjoys a visible but often marginalized role in the
administration of justice. The symbolic commitment to the presence and
* Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. B.A., Smith College; J.D.,
Duquesne Law School; LL.M., Yale Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues,
particularly those who critiqued a rougher first draft, at the Fourth Annual Critical Race
Theory Workshop in 1992, for their assistance and helpful comments after reading earlier
versions of this Article. Thanks especially to: Peggy Davis, Lani Guinier, David Kairys,
Michael Libonati, Frank McClellan, Joseph Passon, and David Sonenshein. I greatly
appreciated the support and research assistance of Gicene Brignola, Doneene Keemer
Damon, Debora Fliegelman, Jeanmarie Martinko, and Stephanie Montgomery.
Professor Mari Matsuda, Georgetown University Law Center, Comment at Fourth
Annual Critical Race Theory Workshop, Mercy Center, Connecticut (June 3, 1992).
2 This Article concerns the civil jury as a decision-making device of the American
judicial system. There are, of course, other civil dispute resolution mechanisms, public and
private, which have been considered, but none has been accepted in this country like the
judge and jury method. See, e.g., CHARLES W. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 6-8
(1962) [hereinafter JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY]. The right to a jury trial is enshrined
in the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution and in most state constitutions.
This Article does not consider how those state provisions have been read nor does it
concern particular problems confronting states.
3 See generally, e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1973) (describing realists' critique of American judicial system,
particularly jury trials, the legal profession, and juries); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 4 & n.2 (1966) (sampling of responses to now famous
Chicago Jury Project); THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (Rita J.
Simon ed., 1975) (differing perspectives on the jury system through contributing essays)
[hereinafter JURY SYSTEM]; Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or
Fictions, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1954) (criticizing juries' fact finding function and
policy making role, and generally questioning juries' capacity for rendering good
decisions given rules and procedures).
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participation of lay people in the justice system runs deep.4 In a world
focused on efficiency and reason, however, the desirability of using this
"transient, ever-changing, ever-inexperienced group of amateurs" 5 has
been challenged by the presumed value of leaving the determination of
justice to a cadre of legal professionals.6
This Article considers whether we sufficiently appreciate the
opportunities flowing from community participation in the civil justice
system. It asks what function juries can perform in meting social justice
through adjudication. The Seventh Amendment mandates their presence in
certain cases,7 and its inclusion among the first amendments to the
Constitution indicates that, at least at the framing of the Constitution, and
earlier, juries were perceived as significantly contributing to the just
resolution of civil claims of right.8 Indeed the jury was seen not only as
a buffer against unsympathetic government and power-wielding citizens,
but also as the repository of community knowledge, distinguishable from
4 Public acceptance of the jury trial runs high, at least as most surveys reflect. See
Most Jurors Would Want Their Own Case Heard by a Jury, Not a Judge, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 22, 1993, at S15. At a recent symposium on the jury sponsored by the Brookings
Institution and the American Bar Association, this perception was confirmed. See Report
from an American Bar Association/Brookings Institution Symposium, Charting a Future
for the Civil Jury System, 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter Charting a Future]. The participants of
the symposium, however, concluded that for reasons of "turf and tradition," lawyers and
judges tend to be condescending to jurors, and that as a result, the system leaves jurors
"underpaid and underappreciated." A Call for the Jurors to Take Bigger Roles in Trials,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1993, at A19 (discussing the symposium report); see also Gerald
Torres & Donald P. Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same
Phenomenon, 4 LAW & INEQ. J. 171 (1986) (commentary concerning minimizing effect
of motion practice and procedural rules). In his Chicago Jury Project, Harry Kalven, Jr.
reports that 70% of the public favored jury trials. See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY,
supra note 2, at 65 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR., Report On The Chicago Jury Project, in
CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 155-74 (Alfred F. Conard ed.,
1955), reprinted in JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 201-14); see also
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1991) (quoting authorities on the value of citizen
participation).
I KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 4.
6 Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
B See infra notes 69-88 and accompanying text. Most commentators agree that the
Framers' failure to include a civil jury trial guarantee was not due to lack of support for
the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 656 (1973); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
83, at 521 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("[F]riends and adversaries
of the plan of the convention ... concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
jury.").
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the legal expertise of the judge. The jury's value in securing a community
connection to law and facilitating the accomplishment of justice, though
firmly rooted in Anglo-American history, has not always been affirmed in
recent reform measures, such as modem rules concerning evidence,
motions and other procedures, 9 and proposals for specially qualified
juries.1°
For people of color, the role of juries has peculiar equivocal signi-
ficance. People of color are aware of the democratic symbolism of the jury
as "preserv[ing] liberty by wresting 'the law' from the experts."" People
of color are also conscious, however, that the "firm rootings" of the jury
in the American past did not include representation of women, blacks, or
Indians, 2 and that unrepresentative jury decisions have frequently
underscored their marginalized status.' 3 Indeed the reprieve of no jury has
been seen as an advantage for people of color: jury decision-making on
more than one occasion, after all, has confirmed that the political majority
devalues the worth of the lives and dignity of outsiders.
9 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a), 50, 59(a). Commenting on the "narrow conventional
function" of the civil jury, Gerald Torres and Donald Brewster have observed that "[tlhe
jury 'instruction,' the rules of evidence, and the interpretation of law versus the finding
of fact all limit the scope of the jury's legitimate function." Torres & Brewster, supra
note 4, at 180; see, e.g., LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 375-94 (1930) (discussing
equivocal role jury played in history); Broeder, supra note 3, at 396-97 (describing
marginalization through motion practice and procedural rules); see also Edmund M.
Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rule of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (1937)
(providing example of minimization in criminal context). Ton-es and Brewster, however,
recognize the potentially more minimizing effect of language of courts and commentators
used to characterize the civil jury, words and phrases like "capricious," "unpre-
dictable," "easily swept by emotion," and, "not given to hard logical thinking"-
words and phrases commonly used to characterize women. Torres & Brewster, supra note
4, at 181 & n.44 (citing Carrie J. Menkle-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice:
Speculations on A Woman "s Lawyering Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 49
(1985) (asking the question, "Is the judge 'male,' the jury 'female?.')).
'0 See, e.g., William V. Luneberg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries
and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern
Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981).
" Torres & Brewster, supra note 4, at 176. The authors, however, distinguish between
the function of the jury as icon and as symbol. "The icon is the receptacle of the past
.. the symbol ... has its being in the future." Id.
12 Harold M. Hyman & Catharine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History,
in JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 25. But see infra note 45 (Thayer's allusion to the
inclusion, in some cases, of Indian jurors in Massachusetts).
"3 See, e.g., Isabel Wilkerson, Middle-Class but Not Feeling Equal, Blacks Reflect on
Los Angeles Strife, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1993, at A20.
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Recently, feminists" and critical theorists 5 have challenged as
impoverished the concept of community participation that is reflected in
the conventional liberal-pluralist interest group model of politics; their
critiques challenge us to consider whether the jury, reconceived, might
better serve even an outsider's interests in achieving social justice. This
Article explores whether we can bring about a more responsible com-
munity role in adjudication, fulfilling the deliberative and consensus-
reaching objectives which distinguish the jury from other players in the
civil justice system.
A number of ideas can be explored in determining whether juries
might be better constructed and utilized. As we consider the possibilities
for a more meaningful community role in the resolution of socially
significant disputes about competing rights, we test how far a commitment
to dialogue and storytelling extends. As citizens, we can benefit from
reflecting upon the extent to which conclusions about the dangers of jury
decision-making are a product of traditional assumptions about the
appropriate adjudicatory hierarchy and of our unwillingness to take the
citizen's role in adjudication seriously. Pertinently, what we have
identified as shortcomings of citizen participation may be attributable to
the responsible way citizens have been asked to function in adjudication
and to the rise in power of judges. The changes we envision in the jury's
representative and deliberative function and decision-making role can give
new meaning to the democratic participatory process.16 A reshaping of our
understanding of representation and its link with accountability for juries
can result in a more meaningful citizen response to disputes and can lead
to a just resolution of claims.
What form could a reconception of the jury's function take? To
develop a response, this Article will first explore the historical develop-
ment of juries, tracing the institution from its beginnings in England, to the
establishment of a constitutional guarantee in the United States, and to the
consequent increase in judicial control and discretion. It will then explore
the characteristics traditionally offered in support of jury participation and
those offered in responses that suggest that jury decision-making is of
'4 See, e.g, Robin West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom
Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); see infra notes 295-332
and accompanying text.
"5 See, e.g., IRIS M. YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
16 A similar trend is occurring in terms of legislative decision-making and the
participation of minorities through proportionate representation. See, e.g., Lani Guinier,
No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413, 1480
(1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats].
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limited value, identifying competing visions of justice reflected in a
reconceived model of adjudication.
I will argue that presently a preference exists for judicial decision-
making that reflects distrust of the citizen's capacity in a pluralistic society
to overcome self-interest and prejudice. Drawing upon feminist and
communitarian observations about community representation and responses
to the liberal model of adjudication,17 including the central position of
courts in articulating and protecting public values,' 8 the Article will
identify the benefits of reconceiving citizen participation in creating and
applying the rule of law. In particular, this Article emphasizes meaningful
representation, accountable deliberation, and communication as necessary
characteristics of socially just, collective decision-making. It will assert
that mechanisms which promote the development of these qualities can
allay some of the concerns about jury prejudice, parochialism, and self-
interest often expressed by those who distrust jury decision-making. The
Article explores the possibility of a more authentic citizen decision-making
role in adjudication. It posits that the interests of litigants and society can
be served by providing for meaningful communication among legal and lay
decision-making participants.
II. ORIGINAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE JURY-THE NEED FOR
COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE
The jury as a recognizable institution dates back at least to the twelfth
century.' 9 Historians who have attempted to piece together its beginnings
are not in agreement, but often attach significance to evidence of early use
of lay decision-makers in support of their own theories about the proper
jury role.2° The historical foundations of the jury are useful to review
because they suggest that active community participation in legal decision-
making is consistent with the jury's institutional origins. Although we have
become committed to a model of adjudication that responds to commercial
" See infrd notes 295-359 and accompanying text. See generally Paul W. Kahn,
Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989) (discussing
a number of these writings); Sherry, supra note 14, at 580-616 (discussing communitarian
quality of Justice O'Connor's opinions).
"s See infra notes 214-88 and accompanying text.
'9 See James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249, 249
(1892).
20 Compare JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 39-42, 47 (fact finder
from the beginning) with Thayer, supra note 19, at 249, 251-55, 265-72 (foundations in
inquisition) and Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 998-99 (1987)
(discussing judicial wresting of control). See infra notes 55, 63.
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desires for predictability and reform and is focused on efficiency and
judicial expertise," history bears witness to other interests of justice that
were served by the community's presence, including access to local
knowledge. This history invites us to consider whether similar interests can
be served by a representative jury which can respond to the needs of a
diverse society.
Founded in times when the judicial process was primitive and society
was more homogeneous, the jury's primary purpose was to bring
community knowledge relevant to the resolution of local disputes.22 Later,
as distrust of government, including powerful judges, emerged as a
community concern, citizens viewed the jury as a buffer against tyranny,23
protecting the liberty of powerless individuals from the rulings of the elite
decision-makers. The modern tendency to limit the jury function and
consequently allocate additional power to the judge was fueled by a desire
to promote efficiency and rationality. 24 Post-modern skepticism about
impartial judgment, however, supports a reconsideration of the value of
decision-making by a collective of diverse community representatives
engaged in discourse about public controversies.2 A representative jury,
guided by rules that promote dialogue among judge and jury and which
21 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-
1860, at 27-28 (1977); FRANK, supra note 3, at 108-45; Broeder, supra note 3, at 402-03;
see also In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980)
(stating that due process considerations outweigh seventh amendment guarantee when,
because of complexity, "jury will not be able to perform its task of rational decision-
making with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the relevant legal
standards"); Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[The]
jury can contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned [and] has infinite
capacity for mischief."), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
22 Justice Seymour Simon, Keynote Address at the Allerton House Conference
Proceedings on Civil Jury Trial in Illinois (May 17, 1984), in 73 ILL. B.J. 140, 140-41
(1984).
23 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 24-25; see supra note 67.
24 E.g., Subrin, supra note 20, at 1000-02; see, e.g., Martin Kotler, Reappraising the
Jury's Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123, 126-27 (1985) (arguing that
unpredictability is introduced into trial process by jury decision-making, impairing
efficiency and integrity of process; jury's role should be limited "to increase
predictability, efficiency and fairness of the trial process"); William H. Wicker, Special
Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 296, 296 (1926) (stating that
economic interests in earlier times were relatively simple).
25 See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist Ideal
and Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an Emerging
Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993, 993 n.2 (1991) (quoting E.P. THOMPSON, THE
POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 8 (1978), concerning other kinds of
"knowledge-production" which challenge the conclusiveness of academic thought).
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encourage deliberation by jurors, can serve the interests of society and the
administration of justice. 6
A. Norman Practice-Drawing on Community Knowledge
Like other historians, 27 James Thayer, in his treatise on evidence 28 and
in a series of articles concerning the development of the jury trial,29 traces
the origins of the English jury to a practice of the Normans which was
brought to England at the time of the Conquest.3° By the twelfth century,
the use of lay witnesses was well established in England. 31 The Norman
practice of inquisition involved the judge summoning a number of
members of the community, selected by him as presumably having
knowledge of the facts in question.32 These community members were each
required to promise to declare the truth on the question put to them by the
judge. The inquiry or "method of proof ' 33 was not only a means of
ascertaining facts but also a method of resolving controversy by a "trial"
at which "taxes [were] laid, services exacted, personal status fixed; on the
sworn answer of selected persons of a certain neighborhood. ' 34 As
community members with information relevant to the dispute, the
summoned neighbors offered testimony concerning personal knowledge
about the region and people in it upon which judgment by the judge was
26 Id. at 997. ("The experience of justice is ... the sense that we have participated
in the system that both defines and creates it.").
27 E.g., MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (1936);
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, JUDGES AND JURORS: THEIR FUNCTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS AND
SELECTION (1956).
28 JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
85 (1898).
29 See Thayer, supra note 19, at 249 (Part I, locating jury's origins in the public
administration practice of the Normans inherited from Norman Kings and brought to
England at the Conquest, and tracing the emergence of trial by jury as we recognize it
from limited opportunities for inquisition and recognition); id. at 295 (Part II, describing
development of jury selection procedures, distinctive jury and witness functions, and
receipt of information or evidence); id. at 357 (Part III, concerning methods of controlling
the jury through the law of evidence).
30 Id. at 249.
I' ld. at 250.
32 Id. at 250-60.
13 Id. at 256. Thayer finds historical references to the procedure of summoning
witnesses selected by a public officer as "inquisition" and "recognition." He views
them to be aspects of the same thing, a developing mode of trial available on particular
questions by grace of the King. In Thayer's view, references to "inquisition" denote the
inquiry and to "recognition" denote the answer. See id. at 256-57.
14 Id. at 250.
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based. This progeniture of trial by jury was the only process available
through the royal courts. 35
Eventually, community witnesses who were compelled to take an oath
and respond, based on their own knowledge, were available by ordinance
in many actions." Written accounts from the twelfth century reveal that
courts assembled neighborhood men and gave judgment based upon the
statement of those men chosen to swear. 37 Thus, for example, in the reign
of Henry II, Justice Glanville describes that on complaint by the King, the
county "assembled. ' 38 Twenty-four of the oldest men were chosen to
answer on oath, vouching for the sincerity of the party for whom
they were called.39 According to a description of one ordinance, four
knights of the county and neighborhood were to be summoned to choose
twelve others of the same neighborhood who were questioned to
determine whether any of them were ignorant of the fact at issue.40 If so,
they were rejected and others chosen until twelve agreed on one side or
the other.41
B. Ensuring Accountability of the Community Witnesses
Disagreement among neighbors commissioned to testify about their
community raised concerns of accountability. The knowledge required of
those summoned was drawn from their own perception, what they had
been told by ancestors, or other communications which they could trust as
fully as their own knowledge.42 In the earliest uses of the community
witnesses, if there was disagreement among neighbors about their
recollections, others were added until twelve agreed.43 However, twelfth
See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 40 ("In the twelfth century,
statutes were enacted expanding the right of individuals to have questions aired before the
king."); Thayer, supra note 19, at 256-62 (describing ordinances). In contrast to
proceedings under the royal ordinances, in circumstances where the ordinances and jury
trial did not extend, the older modes of settling disputes, ordeal and one-sided formal
proof, continued. See id. at 258-61; infra note 56.
36 Thayer, supra note 19, at 261.
31 Id. at 254.
38. id.
39 id.
40 Id. at 261.
4' The twelve knights could say which of the parties had a greater right or merely set
forth the facts so that the justices could say it, akin to a special verdict. Id. Of some
significance, this ordinance provides punishment for false swearing of the jurors, including
loss of personal property and imprisonment. Id.
42 id.
43 id.
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century ordinances included provisions for punishment for the "false
swearing" of such persons, including the loss of personal property or
imprisonment, and infamy. 44
By the time of the Magna Carta, a trial by jury as of right accompanied
new writs and forms of actions available in civil cases as well as, by the
1300s, in criminal cases.45 Originally no instructions were given to the
jurors; rather, they were expected to arrive at the verdict without outside
direction, sometimes going without water and food until they reached
agreement.46 Later judges exerted greater control by charging the jury and
having them reconsider their verdict, and by fining or threatening attaint
to induce a resolution.47 By writ of attaint, a second jury could review the
first jury's verdict for corruptness or false-swearing, and the second jury's
determination that perjury occurred could prompt severe penalties against
the first jury.48
Even after juries began to hear testimony from other witnesses and
were presented with documentary evidence, and despite efforts by the
44 Id. A determination of whether a jury had entered a corrupt or false verdict was
made by another jury in a proceeding initiated by writ of attaint. Id. at 364-65. In that
proceeding, the original parties and also the first jury were parties, and a larger jury
composed of knights and others passed again on the same issue as in the original
proceeding. Id. at 366. Thayer concludes that attaint juries were initially permitted only
by the favor of the King but later by ordinances within the discretion of judges. Id. at
369-75.
" Id. at 265-73. Early juries could not be considered "representative" of the
community; they were selected based on (a) loyalty to the crown, (b) reputed honesty, and
(c) familiarity with local conditions. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
13 (1977). Later, special juries or blue ribbon juries of landowners heard particularly
complex cases. Id.; see also Thayer, supra note 19, at 297-305, 361-64 (discussing how
jury was informed and describing the gradual addition of other forms of knowledge, such
as the introduction of other witnesses).
Thayer also observes that in some circumstances, judges had the power to select
those especially qualified for a given service because they were engaged in particular
trades. For example, a jury of merchants might be retained to try an issue between two
merchants, touching merchants' affairs. Id. at 300. Thayer adds, "it is interesting to
notice that two centuries ago the Puritans of our Plymouth Colony used now and then, out
of policy, when they were trying a case relating to an Indian, to add Indians to the jury,
as in a criminal case in 1682." Id. at 307 & n.1 (citing Plym. Col. Records, vi. 98).
46 See Thayer, supra note 19, at 376; JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at
156-57.
" See Thayer, supra note 19, at 364-77; John A. Phillips & Thomas C. Thompson,
Jurors v. Judges in Later Stuart England: The Penn/Mead Trial and Bushell's Case, 4
LAW & INEQ. J. 189, 210, 214-17 (1986).
48 See supra notes 44-45; Thayer, supra note 19, at 370-74. Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006 (P.C. 1607), ended the practice of punishing jurors for returning verdicts
against the evidence. Id.
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Tudors and Stuarts to influence the outcome of cases by punishing juries
for corruption or false verdicts,49 the notion that the jury could make a
decision based on the knowledge of its members persisted.5 ° In 1670, in
Bushell 's Case, the court reaffirmed the independence of decision-making
by the jury, distinguishing jury corruption from "independence of
mind. ' 5 The jury's independence, in Chief Justice Vaughan's view, was
found in its knowledge about the community from which it was drawn.52
Because jurors could decide a case on the evidence presented in court or
from their private knowledge, Chief Justice Vaughan reasoned that the jury
could not be punished for refusing to follow a judge's directions. 53 Attaint
could be used for dishonesty, but not for a verdict. which was the product
of jurors' independent judgment.54 After Bushell 's Case, judges who
disagreed with a jury verdict could no longer punish the jury; avoiding that
limitation, judges began to set aside verdicts and grant new trials based on
procedural and evidentiary error.55
41 See Thayer, supra note 19, at 364-83; JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note
2, at 156.
" Pamela J. Stephens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Towards a Functional Model of
Justification, 76 KY. L.J. 81, 85 (1987). See Thayer, supra note 19, at 365-75. In part, the
notion persisted because of the reluctance of attaint jurors to find the original jurors guilty
because of the harshness of their punishment for this offense. Id. at 373.
"' Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1006. Thayer concludes that "[t]wo things stand
out prominently in Vaughan's opinion in Bushell s Case: 1. The jury are judges of
evidence. 2. They act upon evidence of which the Court knows nothing; and may rightfully
decide a case without any evidence publicly given for or against either party." Thayer,
supra note 19, at 383.
52 Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1012.
5 Id. at 1013.
5 Vaughan stated that the verdict is "not an act ministerial, but judicial . . . not
finable, nor to be punisht, but by attaint." Bushell s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. at 1014. As the
jury are judges of the facts, a disagreement with the judge as to the findings of fact cannot
be penal. Id.
" Thayer, supra note 19, at 384-88. To justify the granting of a new trial without
infringing jury independence, judges required jurors to state publicly in court and under
oath if a verdict was given on private knowledge and not on the evidence in court. Jurors
rendering a verdict on such private knowledge were required to be sworn as witnesses.
Id. at 386-87. Thayer concludes that the rise in judicial oversight of juries and control by
the judiciary of the process of introducing evidence relates directly to the historical shift
from recognizing the jury as appropriately having private knowledge upon which to render
a verdict, to emphasizing the notion of juror impartiality. See id. at 387-88; infra notes
57-63 and accompanying text.
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C. Re-allocation of Power to the Judge
Bushell s Case notwithstanding,56 by the fifteenth century the power
of the judge and jury had shifted. By that time, judicial experience and
expertise replaced community knowledge as the center of litigation
authority.57 Trial practice was concerned with eliciting witness testimony
and exhibits; 58 increasingly, juries were designated as impartial bodies,
having evolved from "active knowers of local events to passive receivers
of evidence made available to them only in court."'59 Courts developed
rules restricting jury consideration to evidence deemed by the judge to be
56 Chief Justice Vaughan's ruling in Bushell's Case has been characterized by modem
historians as "willfully anachronistic" in its reasoning about the jury's independence.
Phillips & Thompson, supra note 47, at 216 (quoting John Langbein, The Criminal Trial
Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 298 (1978)). Phillips and Thompson place
the legal action in the political context of struggle against the abusive assertion of power
by the King. Id. at 192-94, 221-27.
17 See generally Mirjan R. Damaska, How Did It All Begin?, 94 YALE L.J. 1807 (1985)
(reviewing HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983), which traces the role of canonists in developing legal
traditions, concluding that a turning point was the thirteenth century). Damaska points out
that:
[A]n independent force that shaped legal institutions of Europe in a style different
from the one disseminated by the Church . . . can be discerned in patterns of
judicial organization .... [In] Northern Europe ... the tribunal remained divided
between judgment-finders and the judge as convenor [sic] and enforcer. Only the
function of judgment finders changed: Rather than relying on divine expertise
(ordeals), they were expected to arrive at a verdict by their reason and good sense.
This institution, given various names in different places ... is the jury .... [T]he
judicial function was in the hands of the judge who only 'took the facts' from the
jury. But because the ascertainment of the truth was of the essence of officium
judicis, it would seem-... that the nearest analogue ... was our jury.
Id. at 1819-20. Damaska notes that appeals were not available until the nineteenth century.
He points out that:
In a single-level system of adjudication, lawyers are exposed to the dense texture
and minutiae of individual cases, whereas in higher reaches of judicial authority
particulars are never fully perceived and human drama is muted. It is therefore
easier for tone-setting higher authority to concentrate in broader ordering schemes
within which edited cases and problems can consistently be fitted.
Id. at 1820.
5' Thayer, supra note 19, at 251.
59 Phillips & Thompson, supra note 47, at 220 n.167 (quoting John Murrin,
Magistrates, Sinners and a Precarious Liberty: Trial by Jury in Seventeenth-Century New
England, in SAINTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES 152, 155 (David Hall et al. eds., 1984),
concerning Tudor era developments).
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competent and relevant.6 ° The judge resolved questions of admissibility,
competency, and privilege.6' The law on evidence was considered to be
within the expertise or competence of legal professionals.62 For that reason,
jury instructions, which were earlier available only by jurors' request, for
their edification, became required to be heard, and the jury's failure to
follow the judge's instructions, or its return of a verdict against the weight
of evidence became convenient grounds for overturning jury verdicts. 63 The
judge through post-verdict remedies could therefore subvert a jury's
unsatisfactory verdict, thereby diminishing the independent role of the
jury.64 These developments in law can be understood as part of a struggle
between judges and juries over decision-making authority,65 and as part of
a larger political conflict in England about the exercise-or abuse-of power
by the King.66
60 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 155.
61 Id.
62 id.
63 Id. at 161. Joiner, however, argues that the power of a judge to set aside verdicts
for insufficient evidence or because the verdict was harsh arose from a desire to save the
jury system. Id.
64 See, e.g., Phillips & Thompson, supra note 47, at 227 (motions for new trial and
motion for arrest of judgment available to impose "a rational control on jury trial")
(quoting JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH HISTORY 127 (2d ed. 1979));
Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1867, 1914-15 (1966); cf. Torres & Brewster, supra note 4, at 184 (stating that the judge
imposes instructions on the jury to make it more judge-like; the judge tells the jury what
it can know, and its understanding must be made to conform to what the law says it can
understand).
65 See Torres & Brewster, supra note 4, at 173. Although acknowledging that "[tlhe
jury box is where the people come into the court," the authors characterize the jury as
"quasi-democratic," noting that juries arose in a "nondemocratic culture," id., and that
early juries were limited by property qualifications "intended to secure the 'best of the
country' to act in their 'advisory' role to validate the actions of the courts. Id. It was only
when juries ceased bringing in the proper verdicts that the tension between the positive
law and the political culture was highlighted." Id. at 173 n.15. See supra note 45; see
also Phillips & Thompson, supra note 47, at 189 & n.1. (stating that sixteenth and
seventeenth century reforms aimed at suppression of the jury as far as possible in civil
cases through threats of and actual punishment, and by introduction of a breed of
authoritative judges); id. at 224-25 (in whom the right to decide the outcome of trials
should be vested is ultimately a question of public trust). Phillips and Thompson suggest
that the issue of inequality of judge and jury was ultimately camouflaged by the artificial
law/fact distinction of functions, Id. at 229; see Weiner, supra note 64, at 1886 (arguing
that "law" and "fact" determinations are labels masking decision to submit certain
questions to judges and others to juries).
66 See Phillips & Thompson, supra note 47, at 224-27.
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D. The Jury as a "Bulwark Against Injustice "167
There is evidence that, like their British commoner counterparts, 68 the
Pre-Revolutionary American colonists' distrust of government 69 extended
to courts. Colonists consequently perceived community representation in
court through juries to be critical. 70 Although court procedures in the
individual colonies varied, colonial Americans acted on a common
principle: that every person-at least, every white man-had a right to a jury
trial.71 "At a time when judges were dependent instruments of the crown,
a jury of one's peers and neighbors seemed to be a promising bulwark
against the tyrannous enforcement of the law."
72
To the colonists, judges and juries were more or less co-equals in the
judicial process. 73 Conceived as "a local agency of self-government, ' 74
juries were seen as the "repository of the people's sense of justice,
reason, and fair play."7 ' They "were lauded as spokesmen for the
common sense and shared ethics of the citizenry. 7 ' This view of the
importance of community participation extended beyond the colonists'
rhetoric about colonial domination. After the Revolutionary War, the
original states provided for continued use of jury trials in their state
67 W.S. Martin, The Role of a Jury in a Civil Case, in JURY TRIALS: SPECIAL
LECTURES ON THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA (1959), reprinted in JOINER, JUSTICE
AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 142-43. Juries were also seen as a "bulwark against the
tyrannous enforcement of the law[s by the British government] administration and its
judges." Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 27 (discussing Zenger litigation).
6 See Torres & Brewster, supra note 4, at 187-88.
69 See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 28-29. The distrust of courts by colonists
is not surprising considering the view of common folk in England concerning judges
and their connection with the King's abuse of power. See Phillips & Thompson, supra
note 47, at 225-26 (describing the House of Commons' efforts to restrain behavior of
judges).
70 See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 28-29.
I ld. at 24. Blacks and Indians did not'enjoy opportunities to be jurors or to offer self-
defensive testimony in states with slave property codes, and jury service almost
universally depended on property ownership. Id. at 25; see also supra notes 45, 64
(relating historical fact that juries lacked representative quality).
72 Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 27-28.
73 Comment, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J.
170, 173 (1964).
" Morris Arnold, Societal Versus Official Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 265, 270 (1985)
(book review).
" William Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 731, 731 (1981).
76 Id. at 734.
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constitutions, by statute,77 or simply by continuation of the practices that
had applied before the break with England.78
E. The Seventh Amendment Guarantee
In light of popular sentiment favoring the civil jury, it seems surprising
that the original Constitution did not contain a provision for guaranteeing
trial by jury in civil disputes. The exclusion of such a guarantee was suf-
ficiently of concern to anti-federalists that they argued that an amendment
was absolutely necessary for their support of the document. 79 For them,
protection against class bias was a principal reason for insisting upon a
jury trial guarantee in the Constitution, in part because of bitter experi-
ences with jury-less courts used by the British to circumvent colonists'
claims.80
Drawing on popular distrust of government, anti-federalists were able
to garner opposition to the Federal Constitution by emphasizing the
absence of a bill of rights, and in particular, the lack of a guarantee of a
civil jury trial.8 ' From anti-federalist literature, it appears that for many
citizens the jury institution engendered feelings of empowerment. 82
77 Id.
78 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 655 n.49. There are few published materials concerning
the question of the trial practices of the states under their guarantees of civil jury trial in
the revolutionary constitutions adopted by the states beginning in 1776. See id. at 652 and
accompanying notes.
71 See id. at 670-71.
80 Id. (discussing juryless courts used by the English).
8" Wolfram, supra note 8, at 669. Public reaction was intense. "[T]he ratification
process brought to light strongly felt popular beliefs about government and its
relationship to the person in the street and the importance of the civil jury in preserving
that relationship." Id. at 657, 658-59, 660-62. Hamilton did admit that "it is, in most
cases, under proper regulation, an excellent method of determining questions of property;
and . . . entitled to a constitutional provision in its favour, if it were possible to fix the
limits within which it ought to be comprehended." THE FEDERALIST No. 83, supra note
8, at 564.
The original Constitution has been described as a "triumph of liberalism,"
reflecting the Lockean individualism philosophy often associated with Madison rather than
the communitarian focus embraced by anti-federalists like Thomas Jefferson. Sherry,
supra note 14, at 591.
82 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 671; see Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 29. There
are other plausible explanations for the strong support of the jury, viewed from this
historical posture. James Wilson argued, for example, that juries were a better agency for
fact-finding because jurors heard testimony in the presence of persons testifying and thus
could judge the truth by observing the countenance of the witness. Wolfram, supra note
8, at 671 n.86. Jurors are often acquainted with the characters of the parties and the
witnesses, and thus the whole cause can be brought within their knowledge and view. Id.
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Colonists often viewed the jury as a means of controlling judicial
discretion and restraining judges' arbitrary tendencies.83 Some colonists,
for example, distrusted separate equity courts because they represented
unbridled power of the King and caused needless delay and expense in
the resolution of claims. 84 The jury was thought necessary to check class-
based instincts of the judges.85 Colonists assumed that judges would
identify with the rich, and neglect the interests of the poor unless the poor
were given a voice through the jury verdict. 86 Thus a theme of the jury
guarantee debate was to provide a forum for the citizen to protect himself
against unfriendly government, including the judge. 87 The anti-federalist
movement to secure a jury trial right by constitutional amendment was
built on the belief that jury deliberation would effectuate a result different
from that likely to be obtained even by an honest judge sitting without a
jury.88
A full appreciation of the effort to realize a constitutional jury trial
guarantee, however, should take account of opposition to it. The
Federalists argued that jury trials did not provide sufficient flexibility in
handling disputes and that they overlooked commercial interest in cer-
tainty.89 Moreover, although the jury system was revered as an institution
at the time of the Revolution, some of the unique features of jury
decision-making had already fallen away by the time of the Constitutional
Convention.9" Judicial discretion available at equity and in admiralty
Five reasons were offered by the anti-federalists in favor of a jury trial: the protection
of debtor defendants; the frustration of unwise legislation; the overturning of the practice
of courts or vice-admiralty; the vindication of the interests of private citizens in litigation
with the government; and the protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive
judges. Id. at 670-71. A premise that underlies every one of these reasons was to achieve
results from jury-tried cases that would not be forthcoming from trials conducted by
judges alone, either because the judge would not or could not reach the result. Id.
83 Subrin, supra note 20, at 928 & n.105.
84 Id. at 909, 926 & n.90. Colonists considered the admiralty court, which did not
require juries, one of the most abrasive aspects of imperial rule. See Hyman & Tarrant,
supra note 12, at 29.
85 Subrin, supra note 20, at 928 (citing WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OFTHE
COMMON LAW 20-21 (1975)).
86 Wolfram,.supra note 8, at 696.
87 The interest in requiring juries to sit in civil cases was a check on legislative as well
as judicial excesses. Id. at 653.
88 See supra note 82.
89 See supra note 8.
9 See Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 26-27, 31-33, 37.
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jurisdiction offered litigants opportunities which were of value to the
Federalists and to other colonists concerned with commercial growth.9
Particularly in light of recent rekindled interest in eighteenth century
civic republicanism92 by legal and political scholars,93 it is also important
to consider competing conceptions about citizen participation in the pre-
constitutional debate concerning the structure of government and decision-
making authority. While James Madison, drawing upon English liberal
theory, often emphasized in his writings the private interests and self-
promoting motivations of individuals,94 an alternative view of citizen
participation in government, often attributed by modern liberal republicans
to Thomas Jefferson, was of a citizenry capable of deliberating in order to
reach consensus about the common good.95 It can be argued that jury
participation in decision-making theoretically exemplifies the republican
ideal of citizen access and control of government. It appears, however, that
by the time of the Constitution's framing, there was some disillusionment
even among republicans like Jefferson about the capacity for ordinary
citizens to sustain a public-spirited, virtuous posture.96 Thus the inclusion
of a criminal but not a civil jury trial guarantee in the original Constitution
can be seen as Madison's triumph and a turn away from identifying juries
as a source of defining the common good.97 The lack of a guarantee in the
original document, and the subsequent ambiguity in the amendment that
was offered, confirm that an instrumental conception of law98 had begun
to emerge between the Revolutionary period and the Constitutional
9' See id. at 33; see also HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 26-28 (shift in nineteenth century
courts to instrumental conception of law in support of commercial interests). The principal
argument offered by Federalists for not having a constitutional guarantee was the great
diversity among the colonies of methods, procedures, and standards in jury selection and
use of the jury trial. Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 30. Pre-Revolutionary colonists,
however, had remarkable unity in their view that the jury was an important common law
right. Id.
92 See infra notes 333-58 and accompanying text.
93 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 7-43.
14 See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 685-87; Sherry, supra note 14, at 558-62.
" See Sherry, supra note 14, at 558-62.
96 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 703; Sherry, supra note 14, at 557-58.
97 A well ordered constitution required a balance of powers to check the tendency
toward tyranny and corruption; an unvirtuous citizenry could not be relied upon to
do so. [A]bandoning virtue as the basis of good government, the framers also
shifted the purpose of government from perfecting human virtue to promoting
individual desires.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 559.
98 See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 27-29 (discussing developing instrumental
conception of the law in nineteenth century).
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framing, affecting the view of ratifying legislatures about the issue of jury
control. 99
F. The Limits of Constitutional Support for Jury Participation
Without much debate, Congress and the state ratification conventions' 0
approved the Seventh Amendment. The approved language states:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.'0 '
The amendment addresses some of the colonial fear that a civil jury trial
right could be easily undermined without some acknowledgement of it in
the Constitution. But the language of the amendment leaves unclear the
extent of commitment to community participation. It recognizes the "right
of trial by jury" in "suits at common law" but leaves unanswered how
to determine which suits are "at common law." Particularly in question
is whether the amendment's language should be read to extend the
guarantee to new actions not established at the time of the framing.10 2 This
99 See id.
'0 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 660 n.60, 730.
101 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
102 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 640-42, 660-61. In United States v. Wonson, 28 F. 745
(D. Mass. 1812) Justice Story stated:
Beyond all question, the common law [referred to in the Seventh Amendment] is
the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence. It cannot
be necessary for me to expound the grounds of this opinion, because they must be
obvious to every person acquainted with the history of the law.
Wolfram, supra note 8, at 641. Wonson, however, has been criticized for artificially
defining doctrinal categories-common law or equity-on which judges rely in interpreting
what are jury trial rights. See id.
In Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830), Justice Story defined the
clause, "suits at common law" as "not merely suits which the common law recognized
among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be
ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were
recognized, and equitable remedies were administered .... " Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 193 (1974) (citing Parsons, 28 U.S. at 446). That characterization has remained the
bedrock of interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, settling that the right extends
beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at the time of the amendment's
enactment in 1791. See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193. As a consequence of Story's
construction, the meaning of the seventh amendment right has often turned on arbitrary
considerations of whether the question has historically been for the judge or the jury to'
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ambiguity casts doubt on the issue of the Constitution's affirmative
support for a continuing role for the civil jury. To be sure, the Supreme
Court has voiced a federal policy favoring civil jury decision-making,10 3
but it also continues to read the amendment as referring to English
common law in 1791 as the point of demarcation for preserving the
right.' °4 It can be argued that the Supreme Court has taken an interpretive
stance that does not connote ambivalence: it has not read the Seventh
Amendment in a completely wooden fashion, defining suits where the civil
jury trial is guaranteed by rigid reference to the practice of English courts
in 1791,°5 when the amendment was adopted. Nor has it used a functional
approach in response to the question whether the Seventh Amendment
requires jury participation for the resolution of a particular kind of issue. 106
decide-the "law" or "fact" distinction-or whether the rights asserted or relief sought
were "legal" or "equitable" at the time of the constitutional framing. See, e.g., Weiner,
supra note 64, at 1918-27 (criticizing the categories of law and fact as inadequate today
and arguing for a policy consideration of the competency of juries, need for predictability,
and uniformity to drive the issue whether a judge or jury should decide an issue).
'03 See, e.g., Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (finding an historic federal
policy with continuing strength); Atlantic and Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd. 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959);
Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (calling jury a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of jurisprudence).
'o See supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text (concerning diminishing role of
juries); Weiner, supra note 64, at 1892-93. Discussing the determination of whether judge
or jury should decide an issue, Weiner notes that the English courts did not begin
recognizing the concept of negligence as an independent basis of tort liability until the
nineteenth century; thus the historical approach should result in no jury participation in
the determination whether a party's conduct complied with that of the reasonably prudent
man. Id.
105 See, e.g., Martin Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the
Irrationality of Rational Decision-making, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 486 (1975) (preferring pure
and strict historical approach). Cases exist, however, that provide authority for denying
a jury trial right because the proceeding was not known to the common law. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1937); cf. Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935) (affirming common law right of trial judge to vary jury damage
awards). It has sometimes been argued that the Court's more expansive reading of the
clause clashes with expressions of Congress that seek to limit the scope of jury trial by
statute. See Note, Congressional Provision for Nonjury Trial under the Seventh
Amendment, 83 YALE L.J. 401 (1973); Loether, 415 U.S. at 189. But see supra note 91.
06 In a footnote in Ross v. Bernard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), the Court proposed a three-
part inquiry to determine the "legal" nature of a claim: (1) the pre-merger custom with
reference to such questions; (2) the remedy sought; and (3) the practical abilities and
limitations of juries. Id. at 538 n.10. Whereas the language in this characterization
suggests that the Court is willing to balance concerns, including its assessment of the
shortcomings of lay participation in particular cases, that reading has yet proven
acceptable. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting
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Its approach seems to reflect acceptance of an historical "remedial
hierarchy"' 7 or preference for legal remedies over equitable relief.'0 8 But
even that preference does not necessarily connote sympathy for all the
underlying values of a jury trial guarantee'09 or support for a prominent
jury role in decision-making." 0
There are alternative readings of the constitutional guarantee available
which would more forcefully favor community participation. For example,
a reading of the reference to "common law" in the amendment to mean
the process of legal development of actions, rather than as a reference to
the particular state of the common law at the time of the framing, would
extend the jury right farther-even to cases which would not be considered
from view that jury right should arise in this essentially equity suit); Redish, supra note
105, at 517-26; see also In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079-
80 (3d Cir. 1980) (complexity of case is a concern expressed in Ross' three-pronged
consideration, including recognition of practical ability and limitations of jury). This
proposed functional approach to the question whether the Seventh Amendment requires,
a jury trial in a particular kind of case may suggest a preference for contracting the jury's
role based on the federal judge's view as to whether the jury ought to be involved in
particular cases.
07 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 749-50
(1982) [hereinafter. Fiss, Objectivity].
08 See Douglas Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an
Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 358 (1981).
"0 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 648 n.33 (noting David L. Shapiro & Daniel R.
Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachel v. Hill, 85
HARV. L. REV, 442, 457-58 (1971), and its view that the jury trial is a drag on judicial
administration, results in inflated damage .awards, and should be avoided except where
compelled); see also Ross, 396 U.S. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"10 The Court has, of course, expressed a policy in favor of trial by jury. See Simler
v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (finding a "federal policy favoring jury trials is of
historic and continuing strength"); Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines,
Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 360 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959);
Jacob v. City of NewYork, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (stating the "right of jury trial
in civil cases at common law is a basic and fundamental feature of our system").
In contrast, however, the Court has read the Sixth Amendment, which buttresses the
criminal trial venue provision of Article III, § 2, cl. 3, and requires trial by jury of the
state and district wherein a crime shall have been committed, as not tied to some historical
meaning. See Marjorie Schultz, The Jury Redefined: A Review of Burger Court Decisions,
43 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 8 (1980).
An explanation for the different treatment of the civil jury and criminal jury trial
guarantees may be historical, traced back to the struggle for power between judge and jury
at issue in Bushell 's Case. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text; Torres &
Brewster, supra note 4, at 180 (criminal and civil jury are political cousins); see also
Nicholas Blake, The Case for the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK 140 (Mark Findlay
& Peter Duff eds., 1988) (origins of criminal jury trial lie deep in political crisis and at
every moment of political crisis in English history its importance has been emphasized).
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functionally similar to those actions recognized at the constitutional
drafting."' More importantly, however, despite the fact that the Court has
been willing to recognize a policy of promoting the jury trial right in
cases, particularly where legal and equitable relief has been sought,1 2 the
Court's reasoning sometimes reveals a lack of confidence or at least some
hesitancy in promoting lay participation.1 3 This resistance concerning the
role of lay participants, however, is not clearly discernible from Supreme
Court cases interpreting the Seventh Amendment and affirming the federal
policy favoring juries. Verbal support for the jury right expressed in
Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Seventh Amendment 14 conflicts
with the allocation of power between judge and jury reflected in Supreme
Court-adopted rules concerning the removal of cases from the jury's
disposition and the exercise of discretion in judges.' 15 Similar to the earlier
historical displacement of distinctive jury decision-making features and the
diminution of its independence,1 6 the American jury role has become
... Subrin, supra note 20, at 937, 939.
112 See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 500. The Court preserved the right to a jury
trial despite the fact that an injunction had been filed first. See John C. McCoid, II,
Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Stud), of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1967) (suggesting that there is pro-jury bias in the
Constitution); supra notes 103-05.
13 For example, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
the Court concluded that a question must go to the jury unless the state practice of
assigning factual issues to the judge has been authorized as an integral part of a "special
relationship" created by the statute. Id. at 536. In Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R.R.,
165 U.S. 593 (1897), judgment was entered for defendant- on special findings of the jury,
inconsistent with the general verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed, stating that a legislated
change of the form in which a verdict may be rendered, giving primary force to special
answers, was consistent with the right of trial by jury. Id. at 596. ("The Seventh
Amendment, indeed, does not attempt to regulate matters of pleading or practice, or to
determine in what way issues shall be framed or which question of fact are to be
submitted to a jury.").
Justice Brandeis, in Ex Parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920), reasoned that "the
Seventh Amendment ... does not require that old forms of practice and procedures be,
retained .... New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to present needs
and to make it an efficient instrument in the administration of justice." Id. at 309-10; see
supra notes 103-05.
14 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
n5 See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text; Subrin, supra note 20, at 944-50,
998-1000.
"6 See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text. I have emphasized that the
distinctive feature of the jury was local knowledge and that a struggle for greater control
and concern about accountability led judges to assert power over the jurors, resulting in
an unequal partnership, diminished independence, and ultimately, marginalized signifi-
cance of juror participation.
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marginalized, its presence a symbol of popular assent to the law." 7 Its
continued existence represents a fundamental conflict between reason and
will that is present in American law." 8 Moreover, preoccupation with
impartiality, certainty, and efficiency, rather than representation, limits the
potential for community participation in the systematic development of
legal norms.
Founding liberal democratic premises disparage the potential for private
individuals collectively to do more than pursue purely personal ends, " 9 and
concerns about impartiality, certainty, and efficiency support decision-
making by experts. Feminist and critical theories, however, offer insights
which provide a means to critique the marginalization of juries and can
support a counter vision of a meaningful lay decision-making role in
adjudicating disputes. These theories emphasize the value of decision-
making which is the product of diverse, deliberating bodies.' 21 In Section
III of this Article, I will attempt to identify the distinctive decision-making
benefits of the jury which I believe should be considered in an assessment
of the present adjudicatory framework. I then will challenge the present
preference for the expert and impartial decision-maker, utilizing feminist
and critical theory arguments to support my view that in a diverse society,
a representative jury can play a useful role in the social construction of
truth and can effectuate justice in the resolution of disputes. I will offer
evidence that the Supreme Court has been more concerned with
impartiality than representation, blunting the decision-making potential of
juries. Finally, I present ideas for promoting community participation
through the jury.
Notably, in England and other countries in the twentieth century United Kingdom, the
civil jury has not flourished. See Patrick Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil
Juries and the Allocation of Power, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 47 n.l (1977) (offering British
commentary on loss of civil jury). Some commentators in the United States support
reading the civil jury trial guarantee narrowly, emphasizing the drag on judicial
administration. See, e.g., Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 109.
,17 See Torres & Brewster, supra note 4, at 184-86 (stating that the system needs the
assent of the community to function and needs it for legitimacy, and yet, it fears the real
power of the community; jury is the symbol of democratic legitimacy).
118 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 1 (arguing that there exists a cycle of constitutional
theory responding to the competing preferences for reason and will found in the
Constitution).
, Id. at 18-19; cf. Sherry, supra note 14, at 592 (suggesting that the "Constitution,
especially in light of subsequent interpretations in the liberal tradition, is a quintessentially
masculine document."); Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 57 (1986) ("[The Constitution] so
obviously charts not a participatory democracy but a sovereign authority of
governors-representatives-distinct from the governed.").
,20 See infra notes 295-332 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CASE FOR JURY DECISION-MAKING
What are the distinctive values of civil jury decision-making? Often
"[e]nthusiasts of the jury have tended to lapse into sentimentality and to
equate literally the jury with democracy," 121 without more clearly
delineating what are decision-making qualities and distinguishing truth-
determining features which justify its use. 2 2 Litigators, even when
supportive of the jury guarantee, often cast jurors as pawns in a litigation
game. 23 Conscious that prejudice in their communities runs high, citizens,
when asked, express serious doubt about whether the jury promotes
socially just results in civil trials; yet they also respond that they want
juries to decide their cases. 24
There is much disagreement about whether and how the jury serves the
interests of social justice in civil litigation. Legal commentators who favor
its use emphasize the importance of the community's presence in legal
decision-making 25 and the significance of the collective's expression of
popular will. Critics who are more skeptical of the community's decision-
121 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 5.
122 Id. Kalven and Zeisel provide little explanation for their conclusions about the
distinctive quality of jury decision-making, though they do point to the fact that juries and
judges reach similar results, utilizing different reasoning. Id.
123 See C. Garrison Lepow, Deconstructing Los Angeles or a Secret Fax from Magritte
Regarding Postliterate Legal Reasoning: A Critique of Legal Education, 26 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 69, 75-77 (1992) (post modem critique of the Rodney King verdict placing
responsibility on legal education for lawyers presenting video tape of blows to Rodney
King as insufficient evidence to convict officers for assault). Cynical perspectives of
litigators on the value of juries include recognizing the jury's potential for manipulation
and proposing strategies aimed at avoiding or taking advantage of jury confusion or
prejudice about a case. See, e.g., Donald E. Vinson, What Makes Jurors Tick?: The Basis
for Winning Your Case, TRIAL, June 1988, at 58 (arguing that jurors make decisions early
in case, immediately fixing on a few premises); Thomas A. Demetrio, Should Juries
Decide Complex Cases?, TRIAL, Aug. 1985, at 44 (postulating that jury is as well suited
for complex matters as individual judges); John D. Mooy, Tell the Jury, THE DOCKET,
Summer 1990 (offering story-telling pointers, including how to establish eye contact to
win over the jury); cf. Michael Saks, Blaming the Jury, 75 GEO. L.J. 693 (1986)
(observing that little is known empirically about how juries reach their decisions and
arguing that, based on what we do know, we inappropriately blame them for certain
litigation consequences). Jerome Frank provided perhaps the most scathing account of jury
manipulation in his book Courts on Trial, supra note 3, at 108-25. According to Frank,
the jury tries the lawyers. Id. at 121. But see infra note 127.
124 See Most Jurors Would Want Their Own Case Heard by a Jury, Not a Judge,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S15; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting a public perception of racism in
jury decision-making).
125 See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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making role'26 disparage the capacity of the jury to grasp the legal issues
or move beyond individual self-interest, 27 often questioning whether there
should be any policy-making or law-making function for the jury. 28 Many
critics argue that the jury is expensive,1 29 unpredictable, and inefficient as
well as incompetent. 1
30
Essentially the competing arguments concerning the civil jury trial
guarantee suggest that there are differing conceptions of social organization
and its impact on law. One view stresses the importance of community and
shared values and beliefs, conceiving the community as potentially greater
than the number of its constituents and treating positive law as but one of
the ways to find expression of community values. 13' An alternative view
emphasizes the more formal process of law making; law becomes not so
much a reflection of shared social values as the product of procedures
adopted by the individual or group in control of law-making.'32
Preferring the first conception, I seek to identify what is significant
about jury decision-making as distinguished from decision-making by
judges and legislators. This significance historically was located in the
126 See FRANK, supra note 3, at 116.
127 See, e.g., id. at 123-24; Broeder, supra note 3, at 395, 415, 424; Fleming James,
Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667 (1949). Frank's
critique is more pertinently concerned with the perversion of the truth-finding mission by
the adversary system than with identifying the jury as the culprit.
28 See FRANK, supra note 3, at 113-14; Kotler, supra note 24, at 127, 161-69; Broeder,
supra note 3, at 389.
129 Actual numbers challenge this proposition: it costs $200 million to run the entire
federal court system; of this, 9% is allocated for jury costs. Philip H. Corboy, From the
Bar, in JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 193 n.22; see also Higginbotham, supra note 116,
at 47 n.1 (acknowledging criticisms of jury leveled by Justice Burger and referencing
British experience).
130 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 9.
131 Gerry Maher, The Verdict of the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note
110, at 40, 52-53:
The first, community, type of group treats law not as the outcome of a formal
process but as the reflection of community values . . . . [L]aw is not sharply
differentiated from other spheres of social values, such as morality. Law is but one
expression of community values. The typical mode of law on this model is custom
or common law in the sense of community law articulated but not created by
judges.
Id. at 53.
132By contrast, law in the second form of social organization is the product of some
formal process of law making, which reflects not so much social values as the
procedures adopted by the individual or group in control of law making. In this
model, the paradigm type of law is legislation; legislation is law not because of its
substantive content or its coherence with social values but because of validity in
terms of mode of origin.
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capacity of members of the jury to provide local knowledge from
experience and community connection, knowledge unavailable to the judge
or other expert. It can be argued that the significance of jury decision-
making today can be drawn from an understanding that truth is socially
constructed and that the interchange of views of members of diverse
communities not only meaningfully contributes to the derivation of truth,
but that the interchange can be important for the many communities to feel
a-part of the larger lawful enterprise.
In our multicultural society of often estranged individuals and
communities, jury duty can be a useful opportunity for citizens to come
together in a public setting which promotes exchange. Jury deliberation can
be a time for the exercise of authentic self-government by ordinary citizens
who, through conversations, expose their differences and provide
opportunities for others to understand them. 3 3 Jury decision-making need
not pale against either a model of political majority rule or expert decision-
making by judges. Rather, the jury can be distinguished by its small-group,
collective capacity to explore competing or emerging normative
understandings and to achieve consensus through deliberation. Consensus
reached by the group of individual jurors representing diverse communities
who have engaged in dialogue is important since through their deliberation
these participants can learn from and about each other.'34 In short, jury
deliberation can help individuals through their resolution of public
controversies to realize the meaning of citizenship, thereby claiming a role
in government. 1 35
133 The jury can be thus understood as providing nourishment for the citizen in the give
and take of deliberation concerning a public controversy. Cf. Michelman, supra note 119,
at 71-72 ("judge represents . . . self-government to the community and the self-
government of the judge is constituted by the ... judicial act"). By participating in a
civil jury trial, citizens have a chance to enter the public realm, bringing "'one of the
ordinary men standing around' into a more intimate relation with government." G.K.
Chesterton, Twelve Men, in Tremendous Trifles, quoted in Edwin Kennebeck, From the
Jury Box, in JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 239.
134 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE
L.J. 1860, 1862 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Interpreting Rights).
35 In Traces of Self-Government, Frank Michelman reasons that participation in
government is a positive good, a kind of happiness that can be found nowhere else. See
Michelman, supra note 119, at 57. Michelman is skeptical about public happiness but says
that practical reason-civic virtue's epistemological premise-understood as discussion
which when all engage "reveals" superior values, appears totalist to modern sensibility,
but that practical reason is a role we can attribute to the Supreme Court, which represents
to us the possibility of practical reason through "practical knowledge, situated judgment,
dialogue and civic friendship." Id. at 25.
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A. The Value of Juries
Debate about the jury has centered on five principal areas of
disagreement about its strengths: (1) its law-legitimating features; (2) its
role as "little parliament"; (3) its truth-determining and decision-making
competency; (4) its ability to foster good citizenship; and (5) its
educational value. In the following sections, I will present competing
arguments concerning the benefits of jury decision-making related to these
areas and suggest how a model which emphasizes the representative and
deliberative, participatory potential for juries strengthens the case for the
jury.
1. Legitimacy
The jury has been said to forge public acceptance of court decisions by
legitimizing them. 136 This legitimacy feature holds great promise,
particularly if the jury can reflect the social makeup of society, in light of
the explosion of common law and statutory rights in the late twentieth
century.137 Traditionally, the legitimizing function has had two aspects.
First, the fact of popular participation through the jury makes tolerable
certain decisions which the litigants or the public would otherwise find
unacceptable, because the jury verdict is seen as the product of the group,
and thus the legitimacy of the result is supported in a manner that might
not be attainable if one person, the judge, decides. 38 Second, the transitory
nature of the jury, 139 though often characterized as a weakness of the jury
system, can also protect the court: the jury can serve "as a sort of
lightening rod for animosity and suspicion which might otherwise be
directed on the judge."140
This account, emphasizing two legitimizing features of the jury,
however, minimizes the creative, deliberative possibilities of decision-
making by the collective. Historically, proponents of this account have
made use of the no-name, "black-box"' 4' quality of jury decision-making
136 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 1 1 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
137 See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 9-13, 25-35; see also West,
supra note 14, at 91 (juror's capacity and responsibility for the outcome of the case are
all necessary contributions, rather than impediments, to the vitality of a liberal, partici-
patory society).
138 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 7.
139 See infra note 212 (recapturing the view of Dean Griswold of Harvard Law School
in the 1962-63 annual report, as reported in KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 5).
""' KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 7.
"i' See e.g., Charles P. Curtis, The Trial Judge and the Jury, 5 VAND. L. REV. 151
(1952); James, supra note .127.
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which implies that no one need assume responsibility for decisions.142
Perhaps as a consequence of this aresponsibility, to protect the indepen-
dence of the jury but limit its abuse, we developed procedures to
circumscribe the areas where the jury's impact could be felt. 143
The transient, informal nature of the jury could be looked upon as an
extraordinary opportunity for individuals who are normally preoccupied
with the mundane, private affairs to "redefine as private citizens, our
collective identity," 114 while recognizing that no citizen can live a wholly
public political life.
In support of that conception of the community's role, we could, in
fact, explore ways of making the jury more accountable for its decisions. 45
One means, one which is connected with the desirable objective of having
the decision-making be a product of the diverse views of the citizenry, is
to permit those with minority views to feel confident to challenge the
assumptions and perspectives of the majority. 146
2. Little Parliament
The jury is often characterized as "a little parliament,"147 protecting
the public against tyranny, or, in modem times, abuse of government. That
characterization suggests that the jury device is useful to ensure that we
are governed by the spirit of the law and not merely its letter; 148 but it also
implies that, like the legislature or other politically motivated institution,
in the jury lies the propensity for self-interested decision-making. 149 This
view minimizes the fact that the jury's peculiar value lies in its capacity
for dialogue and deliberation. The capacity to arrive at socially acceptable
142 See Curtis, supra note 141, at 159; cf. West, supra note 14; see infra notes 333-58
and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 55, 60-65, 113 and accompanying text; infra note 230 and
accompanying text.
'44 Kahn, supra note 17, at 21 (citing Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984)).
145 See infra notes 360-440 and accompanying text.
141 See infra notes 361, 369. Studies show that minority participants feel more
comfortable offering their views and challenging others where they are not lone
representatives. E.g., Joan B. Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, in
JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 83-85 (citing research on juries).
14' The label was coined by Patrick Devlin, who commented: "The jury's sense is the
parliamentary sense. No tyrant could afford to leave a subject's freedom in the hand of
twelve of his countrymen. The jury is more than an instrument of justice, more than one
wheel of the constitution, it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives." PATRICK DEVLIN,
TRIAL AND JURY 164 (1956).
141 See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 141, at 157, 159.
149 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
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resolution of disputes is enhanced by the presence of multiple perspectives.
But I also stress the importance of fostering accountability through
exchange between jurors and other participants in the litigation process.
Thus, rather than limit the jury function, we should seek ways to expand
its contribution, by giving it more of an interactive, participatory role in
legal decision-making."5 ° The fact that the jury is not electorally
accountable should not be a reason for marginal treatment,' 5' or for its
decision-making to be viewed as effectuating "justice beyond law."15 2
The resolution of factual controversy and application of law supported by
knowledge communicated by jurors in the exchange of life experiences and
reflections of jurors is law making.'53
3. Truth-Determining and Decision-Making Competency
Much of the criticism about jury participation concerns issues of
competency. Critics focus on the superior intelligence of the judge, her
training, discipline, and social experience in handling other cases, 154 and
conclude that the jury is superfluous or, by comparison with other expert
decision-makers, incompetent. 55 Earlier this century, some legal realists
depicted jury decision-making as irrational and manipulable, sometimes
reflecting shifts in norms while often not consciously appreciating such
normative turns. 56 A reconceived jury model not only must more fully
underscore the peculiar deliberative function of the jury, it must also
respond to charges of unpredictability.
In addition to disagreeing with the view held by legal realists, that the
jury is an irrational group with limited potential for contribution, I
question the importance placed on predictability which generated the
critique of juries and which led to a preference for other expert decision-
150 See infra notes 179-82, 425-40 and accompanying text.
'5' See Kotler, supra note 24, at 134.
152 Id.
15' See United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936) ("[T]he verdict of
the jury is not the conclusion of a syllogism of which they are to find only the minor
premiss, but really a small bit of legislation ad hoc, like the standard of care.").
"' KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 8. Compare Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107
(describing judge as disciplined and neutral) with Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist
Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1929 (1988)
(discussing exposure of judge to human experiences of others) and T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1061 (1991)
(discussing Court's handling of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
Even Kalven and Zeisel justify the jury's function by equating its decision-making
with the judges they polled. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 8, 116.
16 See, e.g., GREEN, supra note 9; James, supra note 127.
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makers. Lay persons are able to view the context of the controversy with
freshness lost to the experts and with insight built on cultural and social
knowledge. There is a significant role for the community both in the
interpretation of law 57 and in delineating the application to a controversy
of generally recognized legal standards. A focus on scien-
tific-professional-expertise ignores the reality that bias arises out of any
human's personal experience and can accumulate over the course of
time. 158 Through dialogue among diverse community members, bias can
be exposed and checked. 59 A focus on lay decision-making potential
reaffirms the value of the personal perspective which, when offered
through dialogue with other community representatives, can blunt bias.
Deliberation by a representative jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community, 6 ° provides special meaning and insight. Of course, this
conclusion contests the legal realists' premise of scientifically derivable
and objective truth, instead viewing the resolution of disputes as social
and the claim of neutrality in law as contestable.
4. Citizenship
Among the recognized advantages of jury participation is that it
provides an important civic experience for citizens.16 For many citizens,
jury duty may be their only experience with the law and government
117 Kalven found "two legal cultures" but found a high degree of agreement on civil
verdicts, as well as criminal ones, although the jury and judge did not necessarily agree
on the premises leading to the verdicts. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 152-53.
Kalven used the agreement on verdicts as evidence of the strength of jury decision-
making. Id. at 498. My emphasis on the distinctive role of juries and the value of
exchange about difference would lead to a closer examination of the premises for the
verdict than the actual verdicts. One might consider, for example, whether there are
opportunities for exchange among the judge and jury to elucidate the premises of their
decision-making. See Zenon Bankowski, The Jury and Reality, in THE JURY UNDER
ATTACK, supra note 110, at 10.
58 Patricia A. Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and
Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988); see also Resnik, supra note 154 (describing
gender and class hierarchy of trial court environment which affects decision-making);
Arlene Sheskin, Trial Courts on Trial: Examining Dominant Assumptions, in COURTS
AND JUDGES 77 (James A. Cramer ed., 1981) (describing courtroom hierarchy, affecting
decision-making).
159 See YOUNG, supra note 15, at 184-87.
160 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2; see infra notes 370-424 and
accompanying text.
161 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 7; Higginbotham, supra note 116, at 59.
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beyond the exercise of a local or federal vote. 62 Thus the opportunity for
citizens through jury participation- to come together and "enter into the
heart of a public matter"163 should not be lost. Ideally the jury institution
can afford diverse citizens the chance to join other citizens in a common
enterprise that can be transformative.' 64 In my view, that enterprise is
concerned with achieving an approximation of truth through the exchange
of ideas by diverse people, thereby meting social justice. 65
The reality is, however, that exposure to jury duty at present is often
disenchanting and causes citizens to lose confidence in the administration
of justice and to be cynical about their role. 166 The disenchantment
experienced by citizens may in part be the result of the failure of the other
principal participants to communicate with the community's representa-
tives with civility 67 and in an engaging way. 68 It can stem from a sense
of alienation-of not meaningfully being a part of the system of
administering justice. 169 Through orienting instructions given by the judge,
and other information made available by the judge at the outset of trial,
including efforts to educate jurors about the function of all the actors and
162 See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 7; JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY,
supra note 2, at 24-25; Charting a Future, supra note 4, at 29; see Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2077 (1991).
163 Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 239.
64 Id. at 240. Kennebeck suggests that authorities ought to give greater emphasis and
publicity to the sense of participation that even non-eventful trials can give to citizens. Id.
at 249. He characterizes voir dire as a competition the potential juror would not like to
"lose"-i.e., to be turned down. Id. at 238. Alexis de Tocqueville viewed the jury as a
kind of school for citizens. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285-
87 (Francis Bowen & Phillips Bradley eds., & Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1956)
(1st ed. 1835). I have in mind not an assimilating model, but one respecting the strengths
of difference in the give and take of exchange. See also Michelman, supra note 119, at
22 (discussing Sunstein and the notion reflected in classical republican theory of public
happiness and the view that "[p]articipation in government [is] a positive good, providing
a kind of 'happiness' that can be found no where else"); HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION (1963) (viewing citizens as participants in public affairs).
165 See Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1862.
166 Id.; see also Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 241; Charting a Future, supra note 4;
Jan Hoffman, New York Casts for Solutions to Gaping Holes in Juror Net, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1993, at Al; Jan Hoffman, Jurors Tell Tales of Woe and Outrage, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1993, at B3 (describing complaints of uncivil and dismissive treatment of jurors
in court proceedings and jury selection process).
167 See, e.g., Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 238-48; Charting a Future, supra note 4,
at 23-24.
168 See Howard Varinsky & Laura Nomikos, Post-Verdict Interviews, TRIAL, Feb.
1990, at 64.
169 Charles W. Joiner, From the Bench, in JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 166
[hereinafter Joiner, From the Bench].
1994]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
reasons for procedures which may be unfamiliar to lay persons,170 this
feeling can be allayed. These steps which some but not all judges perform,
can engage the jury17 ' and communicate to the other participants the value
of the jury's work. 172 Similar to the judge's ability to enlighten and
explain matters to the jury through instructions, the attorneys in their
arguments and case presentation can enlighten the jury. 73
Disenchantment among jurors may also be a product of diminished
expectations about the quality of the administration of justice, pertinently,
the level of representation and case management. 74 Moreover, jurors'
images of trials may be largely drawn from fictionalized court-room drama
portrayed in movies and television programs. 75 The development of rules
and procedures which emphasize the value of active citizen participation
in adjudication can both contribute to a more productive role for jurors 176
and can result in a better educated pool of participants. The one-day, one-
trial movement, responsive to overburdened caseload conditions can also
meet these objectives. 77 Note-taking, question-asking, and even inter-
viewing of witnesses are other reform efforts which promote active par-
ticipation and interest.
178
Jurors have complained of the passive role that they play in litigation
as a principal reason for viewing the experience as tedious and ultimately
unappealing. 79 Critics of assertive juror activity like taking notes, asking
questions, and interviewing witnesses, however, argue that these steps trans-
form the trial process from an adversarial one to one of inquisition, where
170 See, e.g., Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors 'Participation in Trials,
12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. No. 3, 231 (1988); Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 240.
"' See Simon, supra note 22, at 141 (conference culminating in a jury participation
proposal).
172 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 145-47; see also Minow,
Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1862 (arguing that legal interpretation is an activity
engaged in by nonlawyers as well as by lawyers and judges; interpretive activity appeals
not to one overriding authoritative community, but instead to people living in worlds of
differences; through interpretive activity people summon a sense of potential community
membership without relinquishing struggles over meaning and power).
173 Charting a Future, supra note 4, at 15-23.
17' Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 247-48.
175 See id. at 243.
176 Id. at 239-40; see also Warren Wolfson, Improving the Civil Jury. Some Possible
Solutions, 73 ILL B.J. 140, 145-49 (1984) (proposing concrete recommendations and
changes to make jury trials more efficient and useful in the resolution of disputes).
177 Saks, supra note 123, at 701 n.26.
178 Charting a Future, supra note 4, at 18-21.
171 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 170, at 233-37; Simon, supra note 22, at 141-42.
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the fact investigator becomes combined with the fact-finder. 8 ° This
conclusion preempts an assessment of the benefits which could flow from
a power-sharing emphasis on community participation.' 8' It promotes the
image of the trial process as combative and the jury as a group of strangers
confronting the judge and litigants in an alien and alienating environment.'82
Reform measures which emphasize decentralizing control by the judge
and power-sharing with the jury build upon the understanding that dialogue
and decision-making by lay participants have distinctive value important
in adjudication. The citizenship building quality is meaningful if full
representation of communities and opportunity for meaningful participation
in deliberation by community representatives is promoted.
A focus on nourishing citizenship' 83 through jury participation might
be said to reflect an instrumental conception of jury participation which
"8 See, e.g., Heuer & Penrod, supra note 170, at 236-39. Although he is known for
his criticism of decision-making by the jury, Jerome Frank's criticism of juries is really
a challenge to reconsider the use of an adversarial proceeding model as a means of
seeking truth. But see John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972) (arguing that adversarial presentation
minimizes bias).
18' See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 170, at 236-39; Thibaut et al., supra note 180, at
297-401 (presenting some empirical support for claim that adversarial presentation
combats bias).
182 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 151. Kennebeck suggests that a
problem lies in authorities taking the judicial process and juries for granted. He suggests
that there be more explaining during the voir dire and the trial to make jurors feel more
intimately and importantly associated with the system:
Taking-for-granted is a natural part of every repetitious enterprise. Doctors, teachers,
lawyers, and such all have their routines and their jargon, and are so grooved or
tracked into the invariables of their work that they forget how alien much of it may
sound or look to an outsider. To many a juror, 'relief' may have something to do
with relaxing in an armchair or getting out of tight shoes; 'remedy' suggests aspirin
or a Band-Aid. Even 'plaintiff,' and 'defendant,' can become interchangeable in
a layman's mind, especially in some of the more hasty and sloppy cases he might
have to listen to.
Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 245-46.
Kennebeck suggests that an ombudsman be appointed to provide information-i.e., let
the jurors know the outcome of cases which they have been partly involved in; receive
information about the rights, obligations, privileges, and value of their work; provide
literature explaining some of the technicalities of law, including a glossary of jargon
phrases and words that could create a public image of desirable and noble work. Id. at
248-49. The ombudsman "could perhaps do a little 'buttering up' of the citizen who has
been jolted out of his usual schedule and realm of concern." Id. at 249.
183 Nourishing civic virtue through "participation in government [is] a positive
good" which citizens can perform through practical reasoning. Michelman, supra note
119, at 22. See ARENDT, supra note 164 (characterizing citizens as participants in public
affairs).
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does not properly focus on the kind of decision-making that directly
benefits the individual litigants. Emphasizing this individualistic posture,
some critics have also argued that jury service imposes an unfair tax and
social cost on those forced to serve. 184
My reconceived model assumes that the citizen has a stake in resolving
public controversies. 18 5 It begins with the proposition that any dispute
worth pursuing in court and thus utilizing the resources of the state has a
significant public dimension, 186 and that the use of courts for the resolution
of disputes is an aspect of self-government which has transformative
potential for the citizen and, ultimately, for the law. 8 7 The jury's civic
responsibility, however, extends beyond its principal duty of resolving the
dispute for individuals in a particular case. 88 The jury role can be seen as
providing the citizen with opportunities to develop a relationship with
other citizens and with the state. The significance of adjudication also lies
114 See Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 236 (describing jury experiences including a trial
of 13 Black Panther members which lasted eight months, the longest trial in the history
of New York State, and which cost two million dollars, and two civic cases of traffic
accidents, both with "very low reading on the drama scale").
185 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2077 (1991).
186 See Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice]. Compare Simon, supra
note 22, at 142 (stating that litigants unable to resolve their own dispute impose on
undercompensated taxpayers) with Wolfson, supra note 176, at 144 (reporting that trial
is the way civilized people resolve differences).
Of course it can be argued persuasively that not every dispute for which private
individuals seek resolution has significant public dimensions. I agree with Fiss, however,
that this is indicative of the fact that we have misused the resources of the courts and that
we should explore alternatives for resolving disputes which do not have a public
significance. Fiss, supra, at 29-31. Indeed, some disputes can better be resolved in
alternative forums (e.g., through pre-trial mediation or arbitration). Id. We should
encourage such cases that do not raise "public" issues to be removed from the judicial
forum or encourage settlement by requiring user's fees.
187 See Michelman, supra note 119, at 65-73 (transformative potential of judges);
Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1911-13.
188 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. C. Anthony Friloux, Another View
From the Bar, in THE JURY SYSTEM, supra note 2, at 222, states: "Community
educational processes have provided little or no real assistance to the public in this very
crucial public responsibility." Id. In contrast, it can be argued:
[The] Jury should be considered as part of another system, that of the whole trial
and fact-finding process. It is from there that it picks up its cues and learns what
to do. The juror most often comes to court as someone completely ignorant of the
courts and learns from the actual experience of being in court.
Bankowski, supra note 157, at 10. Bankowski argues that focusing on merely the
interaction of the jury in its deliberations will miss crucial dimensions of the trial. Id.
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in defining public values'89 and in identifying the interests of the political
community in defining rights and obligations of citizens that has effects
beyond the boundaries of an individual dispute.' 90 This conception reflects
the general democratic principle "that people should be represented in
institutions that have power over their lives."' 9'
Moreover, the citizens' participation does directly benefit litigants
involved in the trial process. The justice-seeking goals of adjudication in
a diverse society can be served by recognizing the distinctive capacity of
the community's representatives to bring their perspectives to bear on the
legal stories presented in court. 9 2 The value of the jury's participation in
terms of enhanced administration of justice lies in the jury's size, limited
life, and deliberative quality. Finally the jury's truth-defining function
should be understood in terms of its members' distinctive capacity to
engage in the social construction of truth.
189 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 5-6.
190 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S. Ct. 2077, 2085-86 (1991); (f. id.
at 2094-95 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Owen Fiss says that some disputes may not be
public enough; that there are other dispute resolution mechanisms for deciding disputes
that have no public relevance. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 30. He
recommends the use of arbitration to resolve disputes which "may not threaten or
otherwise implicate a public value." Id. Use of the judge's (and jury's) time on purely
private disputes-private because only the interests and behavior of the parties to the
dispute are at issue-is an extravagant waste of resources and such disputes should be
handled by arbitrators. I would use a broader approach, recognizing the interest of the
citizens as jurors to come together and participate in the decision-making relating to some
issues, but would agree that problems more pertinently to be resolved in a non-adversarial
way should be relocated. This may be true as well for certain disputes concerning matters
any person has a right to exclude others from. The public/private distinction, however, has
troublesome connotations in the liberal tradition because historically it oppressed and
excluded rather than respected some social groups and their views. See YOUNG, supra
note 15, at 119-21 (inviting a reconception of "public" and "private"); Robert M.
Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Cover, Nomos and Narrative] (contrasting meaning-giving
communities with the legal community).
'9' Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal
Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705; see also YOUNG, supra note 15, at 156-91 (politics of
difference, focusing upon rather than being blind to difference among groups, promotes
equality).
192 See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2; see also Carol Heilbrun & Judith
Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990) (law as
literature); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Stephanie M. Wildman,
Implied Assumption of a Reasonable Risk: Much Ado About Nothing or Radical Departure
in California Law?, S.F. BARRISTER, Apr. 1993, at 3, 6.
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5. Education about Differences
The jury's coming together can have an impact on the ability of its
members and other participants in the trial-including the judge-to perceive
differences among themselves and to reflect upon whether those
differences have social significance affecting judgment.1 93 My construction
of the arguments favoring jury participation has emphasized that the
involvement of citizens with different perspectives, 94 in resolving public
disputes, including their opportunity to converse and to deliberate, has
educational potential both in and beyond the particular trial. That
educational potential arises from evaluating the stories of the parties and
their witnesses, from voir dire,' 95 and from evaluating the other jurors by
reflecting on their capacity for judgment.96
The jury has the potential, moreover, for causing the judge to reflect
upon whether his responses are drawn from a too narrowly situated
perspective, and to benefit from the alternative social experiences offered
by the jury-participants. Another aspect of the jury's role has to do with
exposing the judge and other professionals to their insulation and to the
effects of repetition experienced by these experts. 97 This proposition
reflects the view that "[w]e come to know who we are-our authentic
selves, what sort of person we want to be, and what we should want-only
through deliberation and dialogue with others."' 98 A civic objective of
reconceiving the jury, emphasizing its representative potential can be
cultural exchange benefitting traditional dispute resolution objectives but
also contributing to the fertilization and growth of normative understand-
ings affecting other participants."
B. Concerns about Costs
A cluster of criticisms about the jury centers on expense and efficiency.
Critics argue that the jury is expensive and contributes to delay in civil
litigation, in addition to the social tax placed on citizens mentioned
193 See infra notes 303-06 and accompanying text (feminist discussion exposing fact
of difference can affect the outcome of decisions); Sherry, supra note 14, at 604-13.
194 Bankowski, supra note 157, at 8.
'9' See id.; infra notes 416-23 and accompanying text.
196 See Kennebeck, supra note 133, at 244 (describing the "sizing up" of other jurors
and interaction with them; he asks himself questions as if conducting voir dire).
197 id.
198 Ronald Kahn, Pluralism, Civic Republicanism and Critical Theory, 63 TUL. L. REV.
1475, 1479 (1989) (quoting MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 153 (1988)).
199 See YOUNG, supra note 15, at 236-41.
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above.200 Data suggest, however, that expense for juries presently pales in
comparison to costs associated with judicial resources.20' It is true that
court dockets have become more and more crowded,20 2 and that jury trials
are often longer than trials by judge. 203 The available data, however, simply
do not support the argument that jury trials delay the resolution of cases.20 4
This is because of the tendency of judges to postpone the reaching of
judgment in order to accommodate other scheduling matters when the
judge is acting as the fact-finder.2 5 Moreover, the costs associated with the
judge's time are far greater than costs associated with jury selections and
deliberation.20 6
The efficiency argument is more problematic. Many critics argue that
the use of jury deliberations is inefficient because of inconsistent verdicts
and awards and because there are experts who would tend to base their
conclusions on law. Although efficiency is a concern which cannot be
ignored in the face of increased caseloads and other administrative
concerns of courts,20 7 it is my argument that other justice considerations
have been lost or not amply appreciated in a single-focused quest for
certainty or undue preoccupation with efficient resolution of disputes by
courts.20 8 The consideration of benefits and costs, moreover, should be
made by focusing on a participatory model of the jury which more fully
takes account of the social and political values of the jury, as discussed
above.
200 Compare Higginbotham, supra note 116, at 55 (defending jury trials as valuable and
a good use of resources) with Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 109, at 457-58 (arguing
that seventh amendment jury trials are a drag on judicial administration, result in inflated
damage awards, and should be avoided except where compelled).
201 See Higginbotham, supra note 116. Replacing the jury panels with panels of judges
or other experts would engender greater expense. See also Simon, supra note 22 (noting
that delays in timing after request for jury trial could be eliminated).
202 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 22 (jury trials are not the cause of the court system
backlog; the delay precedes jury trial and can be eliminated); see supra notes 190, 196
(distinguishing cases which should be tried from other alternatives for dispute resolution).
2103 See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 222-33.
204 See Higginbotham, supra note 116, at 55; JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra
note 2, at 232-33; supra notes 201-02.
205 See Higginbotham, supra note 116, at 55.
206 See id.
207 See supra notes 186-90; see, e.g., Higginbotham, supra note 116, at 47 n.1, 58-60
(principle objective of the court is to dispense justice, not to dispatch business).
208 There are studies suggesting that more accurate decision-making is achievable
through small group deliberative bodies than by a single individual. See JOINER, JUSTICE
AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 27. The cost of juries pales in comparison with, for
example, a panel judge structure for decision-making or the use of other groups of
experts. See supra notes 186, 190, 201.
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A commitment to more than lip service to the jury recognizes that the
jury's special role and competence most clearly rests on its ability to
provide a larger human-interactive dimension to legal decision-making. °9
A conception of the jury which emphasizes the value of deliberation by a
representative body and the dialogic potential for determining truth
210
responds to the post modem claim that there is no objective right answer
and conclusion that impartial decision-making is not achievable. 21 ' The
critics' contentions that the jury's role is of limited importance, if not
superfluous, in modem civil litigation212 should be assessed against a
reconstructed jury model of participation by representative citizens. My
jury model emphasizes the peculiar deliberative quality of this small group
device, to be contrasted with decision-making of the lone judge and the
politically motivated legislature,2 3 and underscores some potential for
accountability through the give and take of communication among a truly
representative body. My jury model should also take account of practical
means for holding jurors accountable for their deliberative action. My
support for a consensus driven, participatory decision-making model builds
209 Emily Stipes Watts, American Literature, in JURY SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 175
(finding a major theme in American literature to be the "Hero," an individual who is
a creator of his personal history, confronting "the alien tribe," often depicted as the
jury). The jury is depicted as the "other . . . those people up in the hills" with
impartiality compromised by a myriad of factors including racial and regional prejudice,
and ignorance. Id. at 176. This suggests not only symbolic isolation but a profound
mistrust of the jury system captured by the American writer.
210 See Bankowski, supra note 157.
211 See YOUNG, supra note 15, at 113-14.
212 Kalven and Zeisel point out that Dean Griswold in his 1962-63 annual report to the
Harvard Law School recommended among other things that the jury be abolished in civil
trials, arguing that "t]he jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the amateur. Why should
anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for their
lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies
between persons?" KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 5 (citing HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
DEAN'S REPORT 5-6 (1962-63)). An American Bar Association Journal article published
in 1924 reported:
Too long has the effete and sterile jury system been permitted to tug at the throat
of the nation's judiciary as it sinks under the smothering deluge of the obloquy of
those it was designed to serve. Too long has ignorance been permitted to sit
ensconced in the places of judicial administration where knowledge is so sorely
needed. Too long has the lament of the Shakespearian character been echoed,
"Justice has fled to brutish beasts and men have lost their reason."
Bruce G. Sebille, Trial by Jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A. J. 53, 55 (1924).
23 See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory
of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, Black
Electoral Success]; Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1485-87; Aleinikoff, supra
note 154.
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on the proposition that the community can serve as an effective buffer
between the "rule of law" and individual self-interest if there is delibera-
tion and judgment, and that a sense of responsibility can be fostered by
community representatives exchanging experiences and considering
competing community perspectives. I also acknowledge the need for
holding jurors accountable for their deliberative action. The reconceived
jury model emphasizes, rather than disparages, the transient, human
interactive potential of the jury institution, positing that the exchange of
diverse views can result in better resolution of individual controversies.
An understanding of the interests which were recognized and served in
a shift away from power sharing by lay and professional participants in
adjudication can be helpful in considering the values potentially served by
a reconception of the jury institution. In Section IV, I offer some
observations about how that shift has been justified in the twentieth
century.
IV. MARGINALIZATION OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN LITIGATION
Commentators have observed that the institutional role of the American
jury was limited as a result of the assertion of decision-making authority
by judges in the nineteenth century and an increased preference of legal
professionals for the equity model of adjudication.1 4 By the early
nineteenth century, judges had begun to restrict the role of the jury, much
as had been done earlier in England.2t5 Court decisions challenged the
jury's authority to decide issues of law, 2t 6 and lawyers and judges crafted
rules of evidence which controlled what juries heard.1 7 The judge, by
interpreting which issues were "factual" and thus within the province of
the jury, and which issues were "legal," and thus without its disposition,
114 See Subrin, supra note 20, at 940.
215 See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 27-28. In the earlier nineteenth century, "law"
was predominantly judge-made. Legislators, however, began to play an increasing role in
law-making, including passage of laws regulating court procedure, prompting a response
by courts. See Subrin, supra note 20, at 931.
In England in the twentieth century, the jury was actually done away with in civil trials
for the most part, first as war means and later for efficiency. Although it can be said that
the marginalization of juries in the United States is a step in that direction, some
commentators have sought to distinguish the institution in the United States and argue that
the same fate will not occur in the United States. See JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY,
supra note 2, at 59-63. My argument is not that we must have juries in every case but that
we should utilize the jury in a way that takes advantage of its unique contribution,
attributes, deliberation, representation, and potential for accountability.
216 See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 644; Subrin, supra note 20, at 929.
217 Wolfram, supra note 8, at 644.
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could set aside jury verdicts as contrary to the law. 218 Through the exercise
of this interpretive power and assertion of procedural limitations on jury
decision-making, 2 9 the judiciary assured that the jury's decision-making
impact was contained.
The emerging conception of the jury is that of a passive instrument of
the court,220 acting upon factual evidence marshalled by the professionals
of the court-judges, lawyers, and experts. 221 The extension of equity and
admiralty jurisdiction in the nineteenth century also placed whole issues
of cases beyond the reach of juries, transforming "what had been
questions for the community into questions for lawyers and judges. ' 222
These changes served commercial interest in predictability,223 but also
reflect a rise in professionalism, favoring the decision-making of experts
224
and devaluing community knowledge.
The scholarship of realists also shaped the understanding of the role of
judge and jury.225 Legal realists unpacked the artificial lines between law
and fact 226 developed in the case law of the nineteenth century, describing
the powerful control of the decision-making elite,227 and acknowledging
that judicial decision-making, like executive and legislative decision-
218 See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984) (arguing that the ability to
distinguish law from fact has systematic effects on the kinds of litigants who win or lose
lawsuits at the appellate level).
219 Thus the trial court can direct a verdict, can grant judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and can grant a new trial. To a lesser extent, the judge can also utilize instructions
and evidentiary rulings to control the jury. Additionally, the court may provide for special
verdicts or interrogatories. See, e.g., Doug Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 KY.
L.J. 769 (1977); Broeder, supra note 3, at 396-99.
220 Morris S. Arnold, Societal Versus Official Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 265, 270 (1985)
(book review).
221 See Subrin, supra note 20, at 923-24.
222 Id. at 923 (discussing Blackstone's disassociation of rights, wrongs, and methods
of enforcement from the social and economic political environment); see Duncan Ken-
nedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 222, 227-34
(1979).
223 See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 143.
224 id.
225 See generally, e.g., FRANK, supra note 3; GREEN, supra note 9; James, supra note
127.
226 See, e.g., James, supra note 127, at 668 n.4.
227 Green argued that there had occurred relaxation of control by trial courts, but with
an increase in control by appellate courts. GREEN, supra note 9, at 375-84. See James,
supra note 127, at 669-87 (theoretical allocation of functions between judge and jury not
followed in fact, in part because of control by judges.); see also, e.g., Weiner, supra note
64, at 1918-38 (more recent effort to provide better ground for allocating decision-making
responsibility than law/fact distinction, focused on law application function for jury).
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making, is "political. 2 2 8 But realists disfavored the use of the jury,
favoring legal reform to be effectuated by experts-the judges and other
professionals. 229 The realist movement saw law as a developing science and
experts as the appropriate participants in the productive enterprise. 230 The
movement offers an hierarchical conception of adjudication with judges on
top, limiting deviant community response. For some realists, the preference
for professional decision-makers was justified by the Anglo-American
commitment to an adversarial litigation model in which winning is
determined by whomever figuratively hits the hardest in the litigation
arena; the truth-finding mission is confined to the boundaries of the
courtroom game with rules defined and best understood by the experts.
2 3 1
This adversarial model is both individualistic 232 and skeptical of lay
capacity to render judgments based on an understanding of the law.233 Both
228 Philip B. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and
Courts 'To Say What the Law Is, "23 ARIz. L. REV. 581, 583 (1981).
229 See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-60 (1986); James, supra note
127, at 681 (describing what judge and jury do and the critical role played by the judge
in determining what evidence will become before the jury); Hans Linde, Judges, Critics
and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 229 (1972); see also HAROLD D. LASSWELL,
POWER AND PERSONALITY 14 (1948) (focusing on role of judge).
230 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be seen as mirroring this skepticism. The
rules, often emulated by state procedures, significantly increase judicial power and
discretion in the management and disposition of cases, with resulting diminution of power
of juries. Subrin, supra note 20, at 913-24 (stating that the majority of rules are pro-
judge). Subrin argues that the Enabling Act of 1934 provided for the formulation of the
procedural rules by the Supreme Court and the Advisory Committee, an elitist group,
rather than Congress or state legislatures, empowering the judge at the expense of juries.
Id. He also describes the proponents of the rules themselves as wanting to be judges and
worshiping the hierarchy of power reflected in the rules. Id.; see, e.g., Robert G. Johnston,
Jury Subrogation Through Judicial Control, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980,
at 24; Doug Rendlemen, Chapters of the Civil Jury, 65 KY. L.J. 769 (1977).
Significantly, the rules have been viewed as the work of jurists and an advisory
committee made up of lawyers whose conscious project was to borrow from equity norms
and attitudes about adjudication which emphasized the judge's discretion and capacity of
experts. Another agenda has been identified as returning lost power and prestige to the
judges. For example, Federal Rules proponent Roscoe Pound said in a speech:
"Everything which tends to restore the judiciary to its true position, which tends even in
slight manner to give to it in the eyes of the public those long lost attributes of dignity,
authority, and eminence which belong of right to the common law judges, is opportune
and welcome." Subrin, supra note 20, at 944-45.
231 FRANK, supra note 3; see Curtis, supra note 141, at 150.
232 See West, supra note 14.
233 See William M. Marston, Is the Jury Ever Right?, 9 FLA. L.J. 554 (1935); see also
Curtis, supra note 141, at 165 (discussing the fact that note-taking is not allowed and
instructions are confusing, as indicating society does not expect the jury to understand the
law). Curtis argues that the jury is kept ignorant in order to permit its intuitive sense to
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these characteristics serve to minimize the value of a deliberative body of
lay persons and to question the necessity for community participation in
adjudication.2 3 4 Much of the ambivalence about juries concerns a liberal
commitment to maintaining an impartial "rule of law" while preserving
the opportunity for equitable intervention by the judge. The emergent
image 23 of the modem judge is one who is not only responsible for
ensuring faithfulness to the letter of the law-common law or, more likely,
an expression of political wil1236-but also, through interpretation and
through application of principles of equity, has the capacity to wield great
law-making power. This image casts further doubt about the necessity for
community participation in legal decision-making.
Brown v. Board of Education237 evokes this paradigm. Justification for
the enlarged significance of the trial judge's role in the era of "exploding
rights and expanding remedies ' 238 begun by Brown,239 drew upon
"traditional attributes of equity power," characterized by "a practical
flexibility in shaping its remedies. ' 24" Though useful in this "public law
litigation, ' ' 24 1 many commentators have cautioned that this use of judicial
operate, avoiding the harsh results of law. "The law calls in a jury not only when it lacks
confidence in its judges, but when the law lacks confidence in itself." Id.
234 The jury was seen by some realists as "antiquated, unscientific, and inherently
absurd." James, supra note 127, at 685 (citing CARL L. BECKER, FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 82 (1945)). Jerome Frank called decision-
making by a jury "capricious, unregulated [and] discretionary," emphasizing its
temporary existence. Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 27-28
(1931) (Frank uses an ethnically focused, disparaging term, "cadi" or "oriental" justice
to describe jury decision-making).
235 The image to which I refer is one principally created by scholarship concerned with
the question of the legitimacy of adjudication and the authority of judicial decision-making
in a democracy. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107; Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra
note 186; Cover, supra note 190; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
236 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982).
237 347 U.S. 483 (1954); 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
238 Gerald Gunther, Commentary. Some Reflections on the Judicial Role. Distinctions,
Roots, and Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817.
239 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7
(1970).
240 See Brown, 349 U.S. at 300. A change in the identity of courts has resulted because
trial judges have been willing to utilize their equitable powers to address social problems
such as desegregation, and Congress has passed federal statutes recognizing new claims
and making available equitable relief to resolve intractable problems like the pollution of
the environment.
24' See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107; Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political
Pawnbroker. Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43
(1979). By structural or public law litigation, I refer to cases often involving public
institutions that are concerned with the vindication of broad statutory and constitutional
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power to effectuate systemic change raises questions about the legitimacy
and competence of the court.242 While the equity focus has been lauded as
opening a "new rights frontier, ' 243 it is a fact that in all forms of
injunctive litigation, great power is vested in the trial judge in defining
rights. Moreover, appellate courts have accorded wide discretion on the
part of trial courts in determining a strategy for relief. Where adjudication
has touched upon fundamental areas of social concern or has been used to
effect structural change, the image of the lone judge rendering judgment
and providing relief has proven troublesome, for many, raising the
"countermajoritarian problem."' 244 The model of the judge relying on
experts to formulate a response to social conditions which are determined
by the judge to have violated public norms 245 is elitist and reinforces the
notion that the community's decision-making role is expendable or, at
best, marginal.246 A legacy of the era of exploding rights is the equity
model of adjudication which justifies the trial judge's competency and
authority to recognize broad claims of social and political inequalities in
a multi-cultural society and to tailor remedies to vindicate these claims of
right. Early twentieth century images of the judge, alone and isolated in his
decision-making, have been helpful in establishing the competency of
judges to assume this law-making role. The judge as decision-maker is
claims. See Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J.
1355 (1991); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186; Abram Chayes, The Role of the
Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Robert E. Buckholz, Jr.
et al., Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978). Much of the focus of scholarship concerning this kind of
litigation concerns establishing constitutional authority for the judge's exercise of
decision-making power in the definition of public norms, see Fiss, Objectivity, supra note
107, and the boundaries of the normative theory of public remedial process, particularly
continued judicial involvement in implementing the public norms necessitated by the
remedial process. See Sturm, supra; Chayes, supra, at 1282.
242 See Gunther, supra note 238 (describing legitimacy issues associated with the
establishment of rights and competency issues concerning institutional expertise and
effectiveness associated with remedies).
243 Id.; see Sturm, supra note 241.
244 See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-22 (1962).
245 Fiss emphasizes the necessity for discretion to choose the strategy which can
effectuate the norm and contends there is no one right strategy or remedial position; the
exercise of negotiating with the parties and the community is political and threatens the
independence of the judge so important for Fiss' justification for the judge's participation
in structural litigation. See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107; cf. Sturm, supra note 241
(calling for a community role at the remedial stage); Diver, supra note 241 (discussing
the judge involved in political power negotiation).
246 A town meeting concept is used in Stephen C. Yeazell, Intervention and the Idea
of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. REV. 244
(1977).
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seen as rational, expert, and distanced, qualities which not only make him
capable to make judgment on substantive issues of law but which have
increasingly afforded him the right to exercise discretion and to use an
arsenal of procedural tools to effectuate justice through creative remedies
and protracted supervision. 247 This conception of a guardian judge, blended
with the other worldliness of chancery,248 was enhanced by the story of
Brown written by constitutional theorists and other scholars,2 49 to justify
the exercise of power by the judge in structural and other public-focused
litigation. In this story, the traditional conception of adjudication 5  as
dispute resolution has been replaced with a conception of adjudication as
interpretation. 52 The judge assumes an active role in defining public values
because of his institutional independence 253 and because of his ability to
engage in a dialogue with the other experts and participants in the
litigation process in his opinions and other rulings. 4 The judge's decision-
making legitimacy, according to this liberal reasoning, stems from his
capacity for objectivity, the result of disciplining rules authorized by the
professional community of which he is a member, and which define his
role.255
This equity model of judicial decision-making to address broad social
wrongs 256 has been useful to support adjudication rather than decision-
247 See Sturm, supra note 241, at 1399-1403.
248 See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 241.
249 See e.g., Gunther, supra note 238; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107; Fiss, Forms
of Justice, supra note 186; see also Kahn, supra note 17 (offering critique of Fiss's
analysis).
250 Today the image often presented is that of an administrator of a judicial
bureaucracy; the judge is still divorced from the litigants but struggles as case manager
to impose efficiency and rationality in the management of cases. Other scholars have
recognized the awesome power of courts engaged in the articulation and enforcement of
rights in critiques of rights and responses thereto. See, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights,
supra note 134 (establishing interpretation as a theory of judicial action in response to the
rights critiques).
25 E.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186 (discussing Lon Fuller's conception of
adjudication).
252 Id.
253 See id. (stating that the courts are the institutionalization of the third party, the
stranger).
254 According to Fiss, the "dialogic quality" of the process includes the obligation
to confront grievances, to listen to the broadest range of persons and interests, and to
"painstakingly justify" and to assume responsibility for his decisions. Id. "The term
'dialogue' is simply meant to suggest a rationalistic or communicative process in which
the judge listens and speaks back." Id.
255 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107, at 744-45.
256 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary
in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1979) (finding antecedents for
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making by one of the "majoritarian branches" '257 to protect the liberty and
equality interests of the disempowered 8 In response to the "counter-
majoritarian" challenge to judicial decision-making of such broad social
or public significance, judges have been characterized as functionally
capable of expressing "public values," 25 9 distinguishable from their own
subjective desires, which political participants are often incapable or
unwilling to do because of self-interest, parochialism, and prejudice.2 60 This
construction of decision-making authority is one-dimensional and begs the
question of political legitimacy.26'
The rights-declaring and remediating roles are also justified by the
attributes of the judicial function, including judicial respect for process,262
and the qualities of independence 263 and, pertinently, the capacity for
dialogue.26 Instrumental judgments concerning which remedial choices
appropriately give, meaning to or actualize public values can, however,
destroy the independence and institutional boundaries that legitimate the
institutional litigation in the nineteenth century equity and receivership cases or antitrust
and bankruptcy cases of the early twentieth century).
257 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 9.
258 Kahn, supra note 17, at 48 (questioning rules as providing political legitimacy of
adjudication).
259 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 2. "The task of the judge is to give
meaning to constitutional values, and he does that by working with the constitutional text,
history, and social ideals. He searches for what is true, right, or just. He does not become
a participant in interest group politics." Id. at 9.
260 Fiss argues that the public values are found in the Constitution but are capable of
different meanings and all of us play a role in the process of giving those values specific
meaning because of their pervasive impact. Id. at 2. The focus of Fiss's work, however,
is to provide support for a judicial role of giving meaning to the public values through
adjudication, principally of the structural kind, i.e., the judiciary confronting state
bureaucracies and restructuring them to eliminate a threat to those values posed by the
present organizational arrangement. Id.
261 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 47-55, 60. Fiss acknowledges that judges are well
advised to look to political receptivity of the interpretive products of adjudication. See
Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107, at 760; Kahn, supra note 17, at 50; cf. Minow,
Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1862 (discussing multiple interpretive
communities). During the reconstructive tasks, federal judges discovered what the task
required and adjusted traditional procedural forms to meet the felt necessities.
"Legitimacy was equated with need, and in that sense, procedure became dependent upon
substance." Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 3. See Gunther, supra note 238;
Kurland, supra note 228.
262 See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186.
263 Id. at 13.
264 Id.; see also Michelman, supra note 119, at 71 (discussing community influence on
judicial decision-making). See generally Kahn, supra note 17, at 34-35 (contrasting
nihilism and republican forms of government).
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judicial exercise of power. Judicial discipline through the adherence to and
respect for procedure has become a predominant concern in the equity
model of decision-making,265 because it permits a functional identification
of the decision-making with judging. Thus the conception of the lone and
distant guardian judge not only is posed as consistent with the modem
equity norm of discretion, it helps legitimate the exercise of judicial power
and is associated with the "traditional liberal distrust of [the] state and
community." '266 Such a conception challenges the authority of the larger
community to participate meaningfully in litigation of significant public
dimensions 267 and can have the result of trivializing that community's role
even in more traditional adjudication.268 It poses the problem of who
decides as a choice of reason versus will, 269 devaluing the meaning-
generating, interpretive function of dialogue in a multi-cultural society27 °
and minimizing the significance of members of social communities
participating in the creation and maintenance of law.271
It seems that the "American partiality to an individualist ideology ' 272
has been translated into a paradigm of court decision-making by judges
who are autonomous and isolated. Yet the "paradox of judge made law
265 See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107, at 747.
266 See West, supra note 14, at 45. Ironically, in the liberal model the judge is seen as
distinguished from the state although his interpretive legitimacy may be merely a function
of the state's monopoly of coercive power. See Cover, supra note 190.
267 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 16-18 (Bickel's justification that in constitutional areas
the people and "the people" were two different conceptions and that the Court has
authority to define public values in the Constitution).
268 Fiss, for example, makes a distinction of the judge's role to define public values,
asserting that the role denotes the meaning of adjudication and not the settling of private
disputes. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186.
269 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 17-18.
270 Fiss and Michelman refer to the capacity for dialogue among judges as authority
for decision-making. See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 13; Michelman, supra
note 119, at 69. Fiss identifies as an attribute of the judge's function the capacity to hear
from other community members. Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 13.
Recognizing that judges can be isolated from communities because of their backgrounds
or as a practical result of maintaining distance, Resnik urges judges to listen and talk to
others. Resnik, supra note 154, at 1944. Although these suggestions recognize the problem
of isolated or situated decision-making, the effort to draw upon unrepresented perspectives
is limited. These descriptions do not seem to envision interactive exchange among
communities engaged in interpretive activity, nor do those descriptions imply an
expanding membership of community that is contemplated in this reconceived model of
jury participation.
271 But see, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134 (describing roles of
interpretive communities other than court); Cover, supra note 190 (same); Michelman,
supra note 119 (same).
272 Sherry, supra note 14, at 562.
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* . . in a democracy'' 273 has captured the imagination of legal writers of
all philosophical persuasions. Often in literature concerning this problem,
the alternatives posed have been principled decision-making by the judge,
himself, or self-interested community participation, usually characterized
as majority vote of an interest-motivated legislature.275 With few
exceptions,276 writing about the "countermajoritarian problem" of judicial
decision-making has failed to take account of the potential for group
deliberation and consensus in jury decision-making, much less the value
of community involvement in the policy making or law making function
of adjudication.
Consistent with the image of adjudication offered by Brown, people of
color and other disempowered groups, at least until recently, 277 have
accepted the judge as guardian, a bulwark against the majority's exercise
of (democratic) will. But cases after Brown which underscored the inherent
limitations and ambiguities of effectuating equality in a colorblind fashion
have led some writers to question the capacity of judges to move beyond
their own elitist experiences.278 Ironically, the traditional justifications
offered in support of judicial decision-making by some scholars279-such as
principled decision-making and dispassionate meting of justice-have been
challenged as contributing to continued subordination of the interests of
people of color and other outsiders.28° Critics have challenged the liberal
theory which justified judicial exercise of power to create rights, arguing
that liberalism does no more than obscure the continuation of social
subordination. 28' They argue that judicial decision-making is never merely
"structured"-rule focused-but always "situated"--context focused28 2 _
and often it consciously or unconsciously discounts the interests of those
273 Anthony Lewis, Foreword to ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS at viii (2d ed. 1978).
274 See generally Kahn, supra note 17 (discussing a number of these writings).
275 See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
276 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 241; Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1987). The characterization that law making is vested in the
legislature, and to a lesser extent in the judiciary, challenges a law making function for
a jury which need not reflect popular will. See generally Kahn, supra note 17; Kotler,
supra note 24.
277 See infra notes 280-372 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 154, at 1928-40; Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1083-
91, 1100-07.
279 E.g., Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107.
280 See, e.g., West, supra note 14, at 45.
281 See YOUNG, supra note 15.
2812 Catherine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1728 (1990).
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who have a different story to tell.283 Thus a blend of structured and situated
decision-making is not only realistically all we can hope for, but may be
preferable, provided that the stories told include those of people who are
presently absent or silenced, and that they are heard by people who can
understand them and can help others to do so.
284
Concerned about this danger of community disconnection and isolation
of judges, some writers have contemplated how to provoke dialogue, create
empathy, and otherwise engage judges more fully in a process of
understanding the multitude of perspectives which can emerge in the
courtroom and appreciating their capacity for validating one view over
others.285 Although commentators have argued that the judge should be
more accountable to the constituencies affected by his judgment,286 a more
prevalent concern is that before judgment, a judge should have the
opportunity to obtain knowledge about the competing perspectives without
succumbing to prejudgment or identifying with one view, undermining the
respect for his decision-making.287 Most often the protections proposed rest
on reinforcing judicial distance rather than considering the need for
increased involvement by community representatives.288
The jury is a device that can be useful for courts to determine truth by
reference to the perspectives of many and to communicate truth back to
the larger community. People of color and political outsiders, however,
have not often promoted the alternative of more prominent decision-
making by the jury. The risk of introducing majority bias and hostility
through the jury, confirmed all too well in the acquittal of police in the
criminal action in connection with the Rodney King beating in Los
Angeles, 289 has led minorities to concentrate on establishing theories about
283 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1957
(1988); see also White, supra note 192 (discussing the law's response to gender and
minority inequalities).
284 Wells, supra note 282; Resnik, supra note 154, at 1940. In this light, the
conservative strategy of judicial selection, which minimizes the need for diversity not only
preserves the interests of the majority, it reflects outright hostility to evenhanded justice.
285 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 154, at 1929; Cain, supra note 158, at 1948.
286 Sturm, supra note 241; Note, supra note 276. I use the masculine pronoun to reflect
the fact that most judges are male and that the liberal model has been characterized as
male in orientation and thinking, reflecting the absence of women in the legal profession.
See, e.g., Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990);
Sherry, supra note 14.
287 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 107, at 103 n.299.
288 See Diver, supra note 241; Sturm, supra note 241, at 1359 (describing dangers of
connection with community).
28' See David Gonzalez, Preparing a Neighborhood for a Grand Jury Decision, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1992, at A23 (reporting plight of Dominicans in Washington Heights);
see, e.g., Anna Quindlen, Across the Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 4 at 17
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rights for judges to impose along the paradigm of Brown, and perhaps to
pursue political alternatives which insulate us from subordination by a
hostile-or, at least, self-interested--exercise of majority will.29°
V. CRITIQUE OF THE EQUITY/RIGHTS LIBERAL MODEL
Recent scholarship of feminists and communitarians challenges the
liberal faith which cedes authority to the judge, 9' or at least focuses on the
need for dialogue with others. I refer to that literature in an effort to
support the jury's role in resolving disputes and promoting public values
in an increasingly diverse and fractured social and political community.
But even in feminist and communitarian scholarship which posits a needfor dialogue,29 or some role for the jury,293 there has been little effort to
rethink the jury function or to offer a theory which makes better use of its
decision-making potential. In their critique of liberal theory and traditional
legal methods, feminists and communitarians, often for different reasons,
challenge the rights-centered, individualist posture of "legal liberal-
ism."'2 94 Their arguments raise the prospects for a meaningful role for
juries because of their dialogic and deliberative potential, though there has
been little focus on this practical potential. On the other hand, critical
scholarship, particularly critical race theory writing concerned with
establishing a representative participatory model for political decision-
making, provides some support for building a more authentic participatory
model of the jury, emphasizing the qualities of community representation
and deliberation. Drawing upon the value of situated perspective and
("here's what came before [video tape started rolling]: Ronald Reagan, Willie Horton,
rotten schools, no jobs .... David Duke. Years and years of rags and racism .... ). On
the other hand, the decision-making of a representative jury presents the risk of judgment
that is contrary to the majority perception of law and justice. See Jury Verdict Calms
Community, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al ("'Some people clearly disagree with the
verdicts that have been read. Some are pleased. Some think the verdicts do not amount
to justice, but justice is not perfect."').
290 See, e.g., Guinier, Black Electoral Success, supra note 213, at 1122-23 & nn.218-
19; West, supra note 14. There has, however, been recognition that the jury process can
be most responsive to the needs of black litigants when the jury roles reflect the majority
African-American urban population. Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1433.
291 Resnik, supra note 154, at 1904 (documenting partiality of racial and sex-biased
views); see also Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10,
45 (1987) (ascribing partiality to rules of judgment); cf. Resnik, supra note 154, at 1941
(judges lack the capacity to find social facts, consider competing solutions and facilitate
negotiations.).
292 E.g., Resnik, supra note 154.
293 E.g., Sturm, supra note 241, at 1361.
294 West, supra note 14, at 46.
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community connection found in the feminist and modem civic republican
literature, I shall attempt to respond to some of the concerns about the
changing institutional role of courts and resulting disfavor of community
participation discussed above, by recasting the function of the jury. Lastly,
I shall offer some suggestions for responding to concerns about ac-
countability.
A. Feminist Responses to Legal Liberalism
There are a great variety of views expressed in women's writing
critiquing the liberal model of adjudication; therefore, I, like others, am
concerned about making generalizations concerning the methodology and
agenda of such a diverse scholarly movement. 295 It is the case, however,
that a substantial contribution of feminist scholarship296 has been the
acknowledgment that law making by courts has contributed to the
oppressed and unequal status of outsiders-groups, like women, whose
experiences of exclusion confirm the bias of existing legal doctrine.297
Feminists utilize the social fact of difference and identify the social and
political consequences of group membership in their critique of law.298
295 See Angela P: Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1990).
296 By "feminist" scholarship I mean writing that uses gender as a central focus of
analysis, recognizes the social inequality of men and women, and sees the elimination of
that inequality to be a crucial social objective, one requiring fundamental change. See
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990) [hereinafter
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories]; Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem " Problem:
Feminist Challenges and Cultural Changes, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1735-36 (1991)
(feminism means "a commitment to equality between the sexes ... [and] to gender as
a focus of concern and to analytic approaches that reflect women's concrete
experience[s]") [hereinafter Rhode, No Problem]; see also Sherry, supra note 14, at 582-
83 (noting that gender-based differences are not universal but "likely enough" that
exclusion of women in the legal system has had a profound effect on its development).
Sherry attempts to distinguish feminine writing from feminist scholarship, noting that
feminists have a political agenda. Id. at 583.
297 See Bartlett, supra note 286, at 831-34; Sherry, supra note 14, at 580.
298 Bartlett, supra note 286, at 832. Bartlett draws four identifiable feminist methods,
including her own amalgam. The methods are: (1) asking the woman questions; (2)
applying practical reasoning; (3) effecting consciousness-raising; and (4) applying
positional analysis. Id.
Because of the problem of not taking proper account of differences, particularly
differences of political and social outsiders, some feminists prefer "contextual determi-
nations" rather than "rigid, bright-line rules." See Sherry, supra note 14, at 605 (dis-
cussing feminist quality of Justice O'Connor's opinions). This preference for contextual
determinations has also been characterized as communitarian; however, as Bartlett points
out, some feminists, and some critical race theorists, are concerned about the danger of
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Feminist theory challenges the notion that missing perspectives in law can
be accounted for by generalizing from the experiences of others,
particularly those who have been socially or economically privileged: those
who have not experienced oppression have difficulty recognizing it.299
Some feminists have been criticized for failing in their own writing to take
account of differences among women, particularly differences of class,
sexual preference, and race, thus replicating the problems they identify.3°°
Feminist theory, however, has the potential to expose truths about the legal
tradition's effect on other categories of outsiders30 by drawing on the
personal experiences of diverse women and integrating those experiences
with theory.30 2
unchecked power and prejudice, favoring the development of more formal rules, which
can be said to be more responsive to the interests of the disempowered, over flexibility.
See Pat Williams, Alchemical Notes; Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Criti-
cal Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305
(1987) (stating that informal decision-making offers little hope of curbing racism); Chris-
topher Edley, Jr., Legal Reform and the Poor: Some Questions, WASH. POST, Jan. 16,
1984, at AI I ("[I]f 'informal' means that rules and statutes can be bent in order to do
what's 'fair' in the specific dispute, what becomes of whatever protections the less pow-
erful party might have had from the rigid laws and procedures?"). Bartlett, supra note
286, at 852 n.85; see also Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1443-44 ("The more
informal the setting and the less iegulated the conduct .... the more likely are blatant
"microgaggressions" [sic] against minority victims."). "'Microaggressions' are subtle,
minor, stunning automatic assaults ... by which whites stress blacks unremittingly and
keep them on the defensive, as well as in a psychologically recused condition." Id.
299 See Sherry, supra note 14, at 581 n.169. As Justice Douglas said in Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946), "The truth is that the two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the
imponderables." Id.
31 See, eg., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION
IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (Beacon Press 1988); Harris, supra note 295; Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539, 539-46.
311 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference:
Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1985). Bartlett, for
example, challenges feminists to use "the 'woman' question as a model for deeper
inquiry into the consequences of overlapping forms of oppression," by asking a "far-
reaching set of questions... : what assumptions are made by law (or practice or analysis)
about those whom it affects? Whose point of view do these assumptions reflect? Whose
interests are invisible or peripheral? How might excluded viewpoints be identified and
taken into account?" Bartlett, supra note 286, at 848.
302 Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986) (discussing practice and theory
dialectic); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987) (valuing the perspective of the
victim).
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Liberal feminists3 °3 seek the inclusion of additional information before
decision-making in order to minimize mistaken assumptions about
women and other outsiders which undervalue their significance.3 4 A
more radical enterprise of some feminists is transformative: by offering
the missing stories of women, they hope to expose the "social con-
struction of reality through which factual or rational propositions mask
normative constructions."3 5 Since their purpose is to uncover the gen-
der-based subordination in law, the methodology is useful to unmask
other kinds of hegemony.30 6
Because women have not been included in the mainstream of decision-
making, the legal structure has considered social experiences from a "one-
sided perspective of a single gender"; 30 7 feminists argue that there is a
resulting distorted tension between autonomy and connection in the legal
structure.308 Integration of the feminine and other outsider perspectives can
alleviate this tension in modem liberalism. Feminists particularly value
reasoning from personal experience, arguing "that reasoning from context
allows a greater respect for difference and for the perspectives of the
powerless. ' 309 Feminist practical reasoning "gives rationality new
meanings . . . [because it] acknowledges greater diversity in human
experiences. ' 31 0 This kind of practical reasoning is in contrast to the
development of universal principles and generalizations that is usually
associated with traditional legal decision-making. Feminists object that
such universalizing obscures the truth of the experiences of outsiders and
their communities. Moreover, as some feminists emphasize, we live not in
one but many overlapping communities; valuable knowledge is obtained
by exploring differences 31 ' and identifying common experiences and
303 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
304 Bartlett, supra note 286, at 863.
305 Id. at 871 n.175; see YOUNG, supra note 15, at 119 (stating that liberal feminists
see law's purpose as protecting individual liberty in public domain; whereas in private,
an individual's "freedom" to pursue her own ends may continue subordination).
306 See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); see also Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1861 n.5 (offering
conception of interpretivists project which includes a struggle "with and against
established patterns of power and authority.").
307 Sherry, supra note 14, at 581 & n.170 (citations omitted).
308 Id. at 582.
309 Bartlett, supra note 286, at 849.
310 Id. at 857; see White, supra note 192, at 50.
See Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1875-78.
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patterns which can be drawn from sharing many stories about life events." 2
Because feminists are committed to the view that "the personal is the
political,"3"3 they believe that knowledge obtained from these stories can
challenge established patterns of power and authority.
Feminists have expressed concern about the effect of disconnection of
judges resulting from the liberal requirements of impartiality and ob-
jectivity.3 14 Both the discipline of distance, which the liberal equity/rights
model requires to preserve impartiality in decision-making," 5 and the
reliance of traditional legal reasoning on generalizing to abstraction, cause
judges to be separated from human constituencies as they disengage
themselves from the context of legal controversy.31 6 Conversations with
other community members minimally can prick the judge's conscience and
provide him with valuable knowledge which is otherwise unavailable to
him in his isolated and privileged position. 3 7 At best, it can expose the
gendered and otherwise biased construction of reality that perpetuates
subordination.318
It is true that liberal theorists have also emphasized dialogic
opportunities for judges. They characterize opinions of courts as subject to
review by other judges, other legal professionals, and available to the
public, and therefore ascribe to them dialogic qualities necessary to fulfill
the common law requirements of justifying decisions.3 9 They emphasize
312 See Sherry, supra note 14, at 589 (discussing literary criticism's reflection on this
tension and recognition of women's focus on context); Resnik, supra note 154; Cain,
supra note 158.
313 Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature:
A Feminist Critique of Rawls'Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 614 (1986); see
Sherry, supra note 14, at 583 (distinguishing feminist from feminine writing). This saying
emphasizes that the feminist context-focused vision is ultimately and irreducibly a political
vision.
314 See Resnik, supra note 154, at 1884-86.
315 See supra note 250-66 and accompanying text.
316 Feminists have attempted to show how this distance and disconnection results in
decision-making that is biased. See Resnik, supra note 154, at 1944. More importantly,
the distanced posture .allows the decision maker to avoid personal responsibility for the
consequence of his acts. See West, supra note 14; Sherry, supra note 14.
317 Resnik, supra note 154. But see Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at
1906-11 (stating that conversation can be silenced or distorted by judicial power and that
there is doubt whether judges learn from the exercise).
318 Rhode, No Problem, supra note 296, at 1736. "The law provides a crucial structure
in which ideologies of denial are reflected and renegotiated. By looking at how legal
decision makers look at gender, we may gain a clearer sense of how social inequalities
are discounted, legitimated, and ultimately resisted." Id.
319 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 239; CALABRESI, supra note 236, at 164-66 (dialogic
role); DWORKIN, supra note 235; Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186.
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the give and take of the existing adjudicatory and deliberation process 32 °
and of the process of review.32' These opportunities, however, seem
impoverished, in part because they are inhibited by the liberal disciplining
process discussed above. This process values distance and thus inhibits
judges from reaching beyond the boundaries of their elite and privileged
world. The conversations envisioned by liberal theorists thus are not the
educative exchanges between diverse social equals theoretically anticipated
by feminists in their conception of dialogue.322
As interpretivists, feminists are often concerned about privileging the
authority of one discursive community over another.323 Thus although some
feminists argue for ensuring that judicial appointments reflect the diversity
of society,324 or that practical reasoning gets taken into account through the
work of increasing numbers of women lawyers,325 feminist theory would
seem to challenge the notion that in their work, judges or other
professionals drawn from elite surroundings can possess the knowledge
available to, or acquire and maintain the perspective of, outsiders. Rather,
a more interactive or relational communicative model of adjudication
seems to be more consistent with feminist theory.
In light of the dangers of judicial disconnectedness and distance, and
the exclusive nature of traditional rationality in liberal jurisprudence
identified by feminists, it seems appropriate to consider the practical means
of drawing other people into the interpretive project of adjudication in
order to take account of different perspectives. A representative jury can
perform this role without essentializing 326 a difference, or privileging 327 any
position. The jury's ability to interact with the judge and to deliberate
can complement the judge's decision-making role, anchoring her au-
thority.328
320 See Michelman, supra note 119. Practical reasoning is attributed by Michelman to
justices of the Supreme Court through practical knowledge, situated judgment, dialogue,
and civic friendship. Id.
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134. Literature concerning the
public law or structural injunction emphasizes the dialogic possibility of community
representatives and their participation which fosters acceptance of decision-making,
particularly at the remedial stage. See Sturm, supra note 241.
323 See, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134.
324 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 154, at 1928.
325 Bartlett, supra note 286.
326 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 295, at 585 (challenging unitary concept of woman);
see also Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC.
47 (1988) (reporting a similar challenge).
327 See Bartlett, supra note 286, at 874 & nn.194-95.
328 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1864.
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Juries, properly constructed, can be the means of ensuring that other
voices are not only present but contribute to the social construction of
truth. The use of representative community participation in decision-
making of courts confirms that knowledge is constructed from social
contexts and understood through experience and is neither "out there,"
nor inevitable.329 It draws from feminist theory the understanding not only
that peculiar knowledge is available to political outsiders and is pertinent
to adjudication of rights, but also that the interaction of diverse community
members promotes social growth for all.330 In the process of "[sharing]
329 See Bartlett, Feminist Method, supra note 286, at 887 (finding central to the concept
of positionality the assumption that although partial objectivity is possible, it is
transitional, and therefore must be continually subject to the effort to reappraise,
deconstruct, and transform). But see Michelman, supra note 119, at 23-24. Michelman
attributes the quality of practical reasoning to judges and looks to the Supreme Court
through practical knowledge, situated judgment, dialogue, and "civic friendship" to
engage in what we can understand as self-government. Id. For him, although other
communities are engaged in interpretive activity, it is only the Court that has the capacity
to practice the civically virtuous activity of giving meaning to public values through
sustained deliberation and discourse. Id.
I envision the jury in its deliberative function and in its interaction with other
participants in adjudication to be capable of the practice which Michelman describes, and
argue that there is capacity for greater meaning flowing from communication among
diverse members of the group. See Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1066. Compare Daniel
Goleman, Jurors Hear Evidence and Turn It into Stories, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1992, at
Cl (offering studies of process of constructing story by jurors and noting that view of
police is different for whites than blacks) with Arlene Sheskin, Trial Court on Trial:
Examining Dominant Assumptions, in COURTS AND JUDGES 95-101 (James A. Cramer ed.,
1981) (noting class and racial bias of courtroom actors and that social and class
distinctions affect how these actors relate to and make decisions about litigants).
330 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1911-13. Much of the focus of
dialogic theory relating to courts refers to the capacity of judges to communicate among
themselves; see supra notes 254, 259, 260-61, 270; infra notes 348, 350, 358 (discussing
Fiss's view of dialogue and Michelman's conception of the Supreme Court engaged in
discourse); see Kahn, supra note 17, at 28-37, 47-55; Michelman, supra note 119, at 60
(challenging Bruce Ackerman's portrayal of the people engaged in civic-minded
discourse). Michelman's article centers on the capacity for elites like judges to talk among
themselves. This effort to locate the discursive activity in the judicial community is
understandable because of the qualities of reason and authority which liberal theory has
long recognized. It fails, however, to respond adequately to the feminist concern for
inclusion of multiple perspectives. Even the movement for diversity among judges would
not fully address that concern because of their elite status and lifestyle. See Resnik, supra
note 154, at 1934-40; Cain, supra note 158, at 1952; see also Minow, Interpreting Rights,
supra note 134, at 1906 (normative dimension of litigants and judges engaged in rights
rhetoric; legal discourse creates a shared world within the courtroom).
Some judges have pointed out that they learn from reflecting upon jury decisions. See,
e.g., Joiner, From the Bench, supra note 169, at 146-47. But even their descriptions fail
to capture the interactive potential described by interpretivists like Minow. In part, this
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normative commitments through conversation, ' 331 there is sharing of
power that has the potential for addressing social and legal subor-
dination.332 Central to the consideration of whether it is possible to
establish such a power-sharing vision of adjudication are the dangers of
unbridled and arbitrary exercise of will and the expression of "mere"
private interests and prejudices, concerns that led to the modern allocation
of power in the judge. Recently constitutional and other legal theorists
have concerned themselves with establishing a conception of community
which can respond to some of these concerns.
B. Communitarian Responses
A "rights-centered" liberal model of adjudication has been criticized
as unduly promoting individual autonomy without adequately taking
account of the concerns of the community.333 Communitarians see citizens
as individuals of the state who through dialogue arrive at decisions which
reflect their responsibility toward their community. Communitarians argue
that liberalism inappropriately exalts the interests of the individual, or
interest group, over that of the whole. Communitarian responses, politically
connected with both the left and right,334 offer participatory decision-
making models which challenge a lone judge's capacity for defining public
values.
Conservative communitarians define the community and its values by
the preferences of the majority. Thus although communication among
citizens is important, minority group interests which diverge from the
majority are to be submerged to benefit the public good.335 Feminist
may be reflective of the inequalities of the participants and of the overarching need to
maintain order, and hierarchy, in the courtroom. See Sheskin, supra note 329, at 90-101
(arguing that class and social dynamics of trial court environment skew decision-making).
A representative model as described below would attempt to take fuller advantage of the
opportunities for learning and constructing truth by all the participants in decision-making,
when acknowledging the dangers of bias. See infra notes 407-40 and accompanying text.
331 Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1907.
332 "Language, accompanying power, enables the powerless to challenge power." Id.
at 1904.
333 West, supra note 14, at 61; see Sherry, supra note 14, at 546 (describing modem
paradigm as encompassing a system of abstract rules that recognize both the priority of
the individual and the likelihood that diversity will engender dispute; "Rights are the
perfect mediating mechanism for a collection of individuals whose aims are essentially
in conflict.").
331 See West, supra note 14, at 62.
331 See Fred Strasser, Searching for a Middle Ground, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 3, 1992, at 1
(noting that communitarians challenge law's injection of its rights language into politics;
traditional individual rights supporters view communitarian ideas as "no more than
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theory, which rejects the notion of one community, is concerned about the
oppression of views or privileging the views of one community over
another's perspective. Feminist theory therefore questions the "enforced
homogeneity" '336 of a conservative communitarian response because it does
not take full measure of the communicative potential of all human beings
and thereby duplicates the shortcomings of traditional majoritarian theory.
In contrast are the communitarian ideas of the modem civic or
"liberal" republicans whose scholarship proposes to rediscover the
meaning of civic republicanism. 337 Not only is the traditional liberal faith
in the individual questioned as the foundation of the Constitution but so
is the liberal rights model's preoccupation with individual private
interests. 338 Republicanism's animating feature is the principle of civic
virtue, defined as the "willingness of citizens to subordinate their private
interests to the general good. ' 339 Modem civic republicans have identified
in the constitutional framing a kind of classical republican faith in
communal life and dialogue to produce shared values of the American
340
society.
Modem republicans view the cultivation of the public spirit as a
principle responsibility of government.341 They believe that through
deliberation and dialogue the public-spirited collective can identify shared
values.34 2 They therefore reject the traditional liberal belief that the
warmed-over majoritarianism"); cf. Sherry, supra note 14, at 555 ("[O]nly where the
object of government is to promote individual goods and interests can diverse,
idiosyncratic value system be accommodated .... [A]n important object of republican
government is the structuring of ... a common value system for citizens and their
community.").
336 Sherry, supra note 14, at 614.
... Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival]; see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference
with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal
Interference]; Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Michelman,
supra note 119; see also Ackerman, supra note 144 (ascribing to the people self-
governing "moments" when they shift from self-interest to practicing civic virtue).
338 See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337; see also West, supra note 14,
at 53 (criticizing Supreme Court's disavowal of the substantive cornerstone of "legal
liberalism" that the Constitution protects nonpositive individual rights against excessive
majoritarianism). But see Michelman, supra note 119 (focusing on judge's role).
339 Michelman, supra note 119, at 18.
340 Id. at 19.
341 Id. at 21; see also Kahn, supra note 17, at 28-37 (offering critique of Michelman's
analysis).
342 The shared values are ones for the good of the whole, not for the well-being of
others, nor even for the aggregate of all individual members' well being. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337, at 1539.
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legislature or other citizen representatives can only make decisions
reflecting selfish group interests rather than the common good.343
"[R]epublicanism finds its primary purpose to be the definition of
community values and the creation of public and private virtue necessary
for societal achievement of those values.
' 344
Pertinently, modem civic republicans attempt to distinguish the modem
version of the republican tradition from the classical one which was built
upon a model of citizen-government by an elite, anti-egalitarian, property-
owning, homogeneous and closely connected social community.3 45 The
modem deliberative potential is found in practical reasoning which can be
used to settle social issues about which members of our multi-cultural
society differ.
3 46
Modem republicanism purports to be built upon the idea that even in
multicultural society, public good can be defined through exchanges by
politically responsible, equally participating and communicating citizens
who can achieve consensus.347 Yet for most republicans, the public role of
the civic-minded citizen-representatives is distinguishable from the
141 Id. at 1544.
3" Sherry, supra note 14, at 551. Compare, e.g, Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra
note 337, at 1546 with Michelman, supra note 119, at 4 and Michelman, supra note 337,
at 1531. Cass R. Sunstein believes that this virtue is obtainable by a deliberative,
participatory process of politics. Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337, at 1546-47.
For Michelman, at least in his initial republican work, judges are the citizens who engage
in the sustained activity of deliberation and dialogue which leads to the articulation and
enforcement of shared values. Michelman, supra note 337, at 1525.
14' Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE
L.J. 1609 (1988); Michael Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic
Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 (1988); Sherry, supra note 14, at 555-56; see also
YOUNG, supra note 15, at 12 (politics of difference, particularly group representation,
promotes equality); Guinier, Black Electoral Success, supra note 213, at 1092-93
(questioning capacity for deliberation without equality of participants). The classical model
is of an "aristocracy of talent, for whom the tasks of government should, in everyone's
interest, be reserved." Michelman, supra note 119, at 20. The classical justification is that
persons not economically independent or secure cannot be trusted to set the public good
above their own immediate needs or to make honest deliberative judgment against wishes
of patrons. Id.; see Kahn, supra note 17, at 82 (noting the problem that sustained
deliberation for the public good interferes with the private attainment of interests by
citizens). A jury's transient nature would seem to address this problem. See supra notes
138-46 and accompanying text.
346 Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337, at 1554-55; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32 (1985-86) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Interest Groups].
347 See supra note 345.
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mundane private activity of individuals struggling to survive in a multi-
cultural society.348
Modem republicans believe that the articulation of values and tran-
scendence of self-interest is possible if the process provides for delibe-
ration and dialogue among a civically-motivated group of citizens. An
essential problem for modem republicans, however, is where to locate this
community of discourse, 349 among judges in the courts,35° among political
representatives in the legislature, 35' or among the people. 352 For feminists
and others who believe in the truth-seeking potential and interpretive
enterprise of exploring differences, it becomes important for the discursive
activity to be carried on not in one privileged community but in many
discursive communities.353 Locating the discursive activity in an elite
community of judges or legislators does not adequately respond to the
feminist concern about inclusive decision-making and the danger of
subordinating outsider views; in fact, it seems to substantiate the claim that
the modem civic republicans are elitist, like the classic republicans.354
34' Both Ackerman and Michelman talk concretely about a dialogic role of people in
their private lives but for neither is the generation of public values by the people a
sustained enterprise. See supra notes 330, 338; Michelman, supra note 119, at 19.
141 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 6, 37-39 (Michelman has a republican court controlling
a nonrepublican legislature; Sunstein has a republican legislature facing a nonrepublican
court).
350 "[T]he courts, and especially the Supreme Court, seem to take on as one of their
ascribed functions the modeling of active self-government that citizens find practically
beyond reach." Michelman, supra note 119, at 74; see also Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra
note 186, at 13 (noting the dialogic capacity of judges); cf. Michelman, supra note 337,
at 1529. Unlike Sunstein, and more like Ackerman, Michelman focuses on "the practice
of dialogic self-government ... [which] appears in ... constitutional practice," but he
locates civic engagement in the judiciary. Michelman, supra note 119, at 60. He
concludes:
[W]e do not write the story unless we happen to be justices. It is they who are
finally envisioned as the active practical reasoners and ethical self-governors. The
Court at the last appears not as representative of the People's declared will but as
representation and trace of the People's absent self-government.
Id. at 65.
311 Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337, at 1558-60; Sunstein, Interest
Groups, supra note 346, at 41.
352 Ackerman, supra note 144.
353 See, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1862.
314 See, e.g., Fitts, supra note 345, at 1660. Even Sunstein's identification of the
legislature as the dialogic community is problematic since his theory of political decision-
making depends at once on judicial deference to the political decision-making and on
assuring representation and a process for assuring deliberation. Without a reconception of
political equality, skepticism remains about whether women, blacks, and other traditional
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Civic responsibility entails understanding that in their public
deliberation, citizens are "responsible to and for the community. ' 355 That
understanding is created through dialogue and deliberation but is made
possible because of the capacity of citizens to sympathize with other
community members and to feel morally responsible for the social
circumstances of others because they make choices which affect citizens.
The practical reasoning described by feminists can be of importance here.
Through the sharing of their own experiences, representatives of
communities can both explore differences and arrive at commonalities
through communal talk, and thus "through discourse [the] common values
are revealed and maintained. '
356
Republican theory is attractive because it presses us to imagine a
process for community participation in which dialogue helps to mold
individual or group values as well as values for the community.357 The
republicanism revival, however, seems not to have survived criticism that
only elite members of society can have membership in the envisioned self-
governing community because only they are capable of engaging in
sustained and reasoned, self-constitutive dialogue.358
outsiders will be included or continue to be outside the community of decision-makers.
Bell & Bansal, supra note 345, at 1613.
315 West, supra note 14, at 91.
356 Kahn, supra note 17, at 3.
... Id. at 37.
358 See Fitts, supra note 345, at 1652; Kahn, supra note 17, at 37. Bruce Ackerman,
among the scholars associated with the modem republican scholars, does acknowledge a
role for "the people" during "constitutional moments" in history. See Kahn, supra
note 17, at 27 & n. 117. He distinguishes those momentary self-governing activities from
other times when the people are engaged in normal, self-interested politics. Id. Michel-
man, in contrast, locates the meaning-giving dialogic enterprise in the community of
members of the Supreme Court. See Michelman, supra note 119, at 20. He, like others,
criticizes Ackerman's romantic conception of the people rising to the constitutional
occasions and finds no way of distinguishing the moments when the people shift their
attention from self-interest to civic virtue. Id. at 62. The criticism that sustained practice
of civic virtue seems unrealistic for "the people," as a normal course of life seems well
taken, but the occasional practice of individuals acting as civically responsible jurors
would not be unrealistic. The problem remains of ensuring that citizens in their capacity
as jurors do exercise that virtuous stand. I argue that in addition to procedures which
affirm the power-sharing relationship of judge and jury decision-making, procedures that
foster authentic representation of groups and procedures which provoke, not submerge,
a consciousness of difference, combined with greater interaction with the professionals,
would help. See also Kahn, supra note 17, at 17, 37 (noting Ackerman's republican
politics and Michelman's republican court); BICKEL, supra note 244, at 25-26 (stating
"[jludges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the
ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government.").
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And yet why is this so? I imagine the jury as an institution capable of
providing the opportunity for self-government to the broadest segment
of our multicultural society. The jury can become an institutional model of
community that mediates the conflict between the traditionally privileged
authority of legal reason and the majoritarian-focused expression of popular
will. The device of the jury can bring citizens together to define values
through dialogue. The dialogue of a representative jury can press citizens
to more fully accept responsibility for their decision-making, provided that
there are procedures which not only ensure that its members represent
identified groups within the community but that in its dialogue and delib-
eration, the jury confronts the social consequences of human differences.359
VI. A RECONCEIVED MODEL OF JURY DECISION-MAKING
More meaningful citizen participation in adjudication, through a
restructuring of the jury function, should emphasize the need for authentic
representation,"' meaningful communication, and deliberative account-
ability. This conception acknowledges the limitations of a lone decision-
maker and holds some confidence in the human capacity for interchange
which can contribute to the social construction of truth both at trial and
within the collective.36' Significantly, it recognizes a public -stake in the
359
The juror's responsibility for his fellow citizen, and responsibility to reach the
morally right decision, is precisely what defines the juror as citizen; it is central
rather than peripheral to his humanity and his social being. In turn, the juror's
capacity for empathy and sympathy, far from being distractions from principled,
rational, objective moral decision making... is precisely what enables morality.
That capacity gives the juror a stake in the affairs of others and makes him care
about the consequences of his decision. The juror's capacity, . . . and his
responsibility for the outcome are all necessary contributions, rather than
impediments to the vitality of a liberal, participatory, and non-apathetic society.
West, supra note 14, at 91.
" Representation here does not take its meaning from an electoral model in the sense
that the juror acts as agent on behalf of her constituent group. Rather, the juror's
representative status has symbolic meaning, relating to the cultural and social connections
which she experiences. See Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1083 n. 106 (stating that group-
consciousness not intended as suppressing the diversity within groups); Trina Grillo &
Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making
Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397
(explaining intersectionality of racism and sexism); cf. HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF
REPRESENTATION (1967).
361 Research concerning small group deliberation suggests that a theoretical ability to
effectuate meaningful exchange among a diverse group can be compromised by prejudice
and unfair influence of individuals holding majority viewpoints. See, e.g., KALVEN &
ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 462 (arguing that substantial representation of minority viewpoint
is necessary at beginning of deliberation in order to be influential); SAUL M. KASSIN &
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decision-making process and assumes that because that stake is shared by
all citizens, measures to increase participation are warranted.362 It looks to
increase the participation of those who have some stake by taking affirma-
tive steps to effectuate the representativeness aspiration by identifying
appropriate procedures that promote the values of deliberation and
dialogue.363 The promotion of these values entails some effort to foster
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 197 (1988) (stating that the presence of an ally can determine whether
minorities withstand pressure). Although it seems clear from empirical data which exists
about juries and small group decision-making that token representation leads to the
diminished influence of minority viewpoints, there is less clarity about whether the
influence is affected by relative or absolute size of minority representation. Compare
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3 and KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra with, e.g., Rosabeth
Kanter, Some Effects of Proportion on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses to
Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965 (1977) (stating that proportions are critical in shaping
interaction); Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and
Distortion of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (G. Swanson et al. eds.,
1952) (relative size).
Empirical data do seem to suggest that prejudice breeds lack of cooperation and
disproportionate influence of majority group members because of perceived superiority-by
them and perhaps, by the minorities. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra, at 179. From that
data, certain significant environmental factors emerge: (1) minorities need allies; token
representation defeats the capacity for influence or meaningful participation in the
exchange; and (2) effective deliberation is not fostered in majority-rule settings. See, e.g,
REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 229-30 (1983); KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra, at
203-04; Charlan Nemeth, Interaction Between Jurors as a Function of Majority v.
Unanimity Decision Rule, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38 (1977); see also Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1970) (stating that minority group representation on a jury
may simply be outvoted).
For a collection of authorities concerning effects on the deliberation ideal in the context
of the issue of effectuating effective black representation in local politics, see Guinier,
Black Electoral Success, supra note 213, at 1116-23; see also DAVID KAIRYS, THE JURY
SYSTEM: NEW METHODS FOR REDUCING PREJUDICE 31-40 (1975) (offering concrete
proposals).
362 It could be argued of course that the public's interest extends beyond the citizens
to all members of society. In part, the difficulty of defining the members of society who
should participate is that there is no one community-unless it is the political
community-envisioned when we speak of "the public." I have attempted to argue that
a reason for making the case for increased participation is that "the public" has some
stake in the resolution of even private disputes that benefit from the use of public
resources and for which courts have through the application of law identified controlling
public values. I have used "citizen" to connote those members of society who are likely
to benefit---or lose-from the identification of those values.
363 This conception of legal decision-making responsibility avoids identifying an elite
governing entity and imposing on ordinary citizens the "authoritarian, external rule."
Kahn, supra note 17, at 40. Although the Supreme Court has in the context of considering
the state action requirement of a fourteenth amendment peremptory challenge noted the
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equality among participants in order to ensure their willingness to share in-
formation and to engage in good faith interaction.36 Ultimately, this
conception imagines the possibility of integrating reason and will: the pos-
sibility of "the ability of reason to persuade and of will to be
persuaded ' 365 through a more meaningful sharing of decision-making
366power by judge and jury.
This proposal attempts to provide a "reconciliation of the modem and
classic paradigms in adjudication. "367 I have argued that a richer
community conception is possible and can better effectuate justice than is
possible under the present rights-centered liberal model of adjudication.
This argument is based on the premise that community participation in
decision-making by itself has value, 368 a premise that the feminist and
communitarian critiques of the liberal model of adjudication support. I
have also argued that the history of juries and the rise in power of the trial
judge reflects a tendency to marginalize the citizen's role in the resolution
of public disputes which should be reconsidered. In this section I shall
important role that citizens play in the civil trial and commented on the necessity for
public confidence in the system, it has not focused on the value of dialogue or described
what is meaningful participation in decision-making as a part of the seventh amendment
right. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I I I S. Ct. 2077, 2085-87 (1991).
3' This discussion centers on the promotion of these values in the jury context itself
and is not concerned with external considerations of how these values can be fostered
further. For example, meaningful communication could be enhanced by providing better
education for citizens generally, but that is a matter outside the purview of this Article.
Earlier, however, I referred to the benefits of informing the jury about its decision-making
role and about its relationship to other participants as a relevant educational consideration
because it provides a means of more fully engaging jurors in their particular meaning-
giving enterprise. See supra notes 174-78, 188-91 and accompanying text.
365 Kahn, supra note 17, at 9.
3' For discussions of courts as having a representative role in a democracy, see Kahn,
supra note 17, at 23; Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 186, at 2; supra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text.
367 Sherry, supra note 14, at 589. It avoids the problem of freeing the elite governing
entity while imposing on ordinary citizens authoritarian external rule. Kahn, supra note
17, at 40.
368 1 subscribe to the view that there is intrinsic value in attempting to achieve full
membership in the decision-making community. See supra notes 157-60, 360-67; see also
Sherry, supra note 14, at 594-601 (tracking Justice O'Connor's concern for outsiders
from the political community membership in cases like Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (sending a message that outsiders are full members of the
political community)). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1078 (discussing Justice
O'Connor's position in affirmative action cases).
I also agree with the notion that "[plositive freedom cannot be achieved by
compliance with a set of authoritative rules, even if they emerge from someone else's
dialogue." Kahn, supra note 17, at 33.
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consider whether some of the acknowledged dangers of participation-self-
interest, prejudice, and parochialism of the members of the jury-can be
addressed through this reconceived model.369
A. Authentic Representation
As critical race theory scholars have emphasized, in our multicultural
society no alternative for decision-making can provide the basis for mean-
ingful exchange without a reconceptualization of political and social equal-
ity, fostering respect. 370 The requirement of representativeness in this re-
conceived model of adjudication responds to the need for individuals to
see others as social and political equals and responds to the desirability of
proportional power in decision-making. This requirement, however, is not
primarily focused upon achieving popular consent to the decision-making
by courts, although I believe that participation of citizens can ground the
authority of adjudication in a manner not possible under the present
model.37 1
The significance of a requirement of representativeness lies in pro-
moting the interpretive capacity of individual jurors in deliberation and
through communication with judges and other legal professionals. An
emphasis on representativeness in participation can respond to the problem
of unchecked power by the judge and the danger of group-focused
369 I believe that the possibility for more meaningful decision-making participation is
possible but that there has been insufficient study of how small groups and in particular
juries deliberate. Much of the data concerning juries were developed at earlier times in
our history and are in conflict. See, e.g., Cookie Stephan, Selective Characteristics of
Jurors and Litigants: Their Influences on Juries' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM, supra
note 3, at 97, 115; Sarah McCabe, Is Jury Research Dead?, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK,
supra note 110, at 27; see supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text. Data about gender
and difference are limited and contradictory. See supra notes 361, 369; KALVEN & ZEISEL,
supra note 3, at 195; Stephan, supra, at 105-09, 113-15; Edmond Costantini et al., Gender
and Juror Partiality: Are Women More Likely to Prejudge Guilt?, 67 JUDICATURE 120,
122, 126-27 (1983-84). Most importantly, legal analysis of the social science data is
undeveloped. See Guinier, Black Electoral Success, supra note 213, at 1120 n.202.
370 See Guinier, Black Electoral Success, supra note 213; Guinier, No Two Seats, supra
note 16; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "'Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1991); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758; see also Aleinikoff,
supra note 154, at 1109 ("First, whites must see blacks in positions of power, authority,
and responsibility ... [s]econd, whites must begin to recognize and credit self-definition
by subordinated groups.").
371 See Kahn, supra note 17, at 9-18 (1989) (challenging Bickel's focus on lack of
consent in adjudication as reflective of the countermajoritarian difficulty); id. at 23-24
(arguing that it is not universalism of participation and assent, but quality of political life
that distinguishes constitutional from mundane politics).
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prejudice by making better use of the social and intellectual processes by
which individuals and groups engage in meaningful exchange of ideas,
deliberate, and achieve consensus. 37 2 To address the problems of self-
interest, parochialism, and prejudice, however, this model must take
account of how difference is presently devalued as well as how valuing
difference-through a focus on representativeness-can avoid such problems.
In this section, I consider present factors that constrict and constrain voices
from being heard and make some suggestions about how those restrictions
can be alleviated, and dialogue promoted.
1. The Fair and Impartial Jury Requirement
Both in civil as well as criminal cases where the controversy relates to
jury selection, impartiality has been a concern.373 The Supreme Court has
not recognized a fundamental requirement of a representative jury,"7
although there is language in Supreme Court cases defining a right to trial
372 See, e.g., Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at 1862 (discussing
interpretive enterprise of communities); Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1061 (critiquing
color-blind and offering color-conscious political strategy for justice). The issue of how
and whether diverse groups working in an informal and fairly intimate environment can
engage in meaningful deliberation and reach consensus deserves more study, but data
suggest that minority influence will be compromised in some environments. See supra
notes 361, 369.
373 Although the Sixth Amendment speaks of impartiality in its language, the Seventh
Amendment does not. The concept of fairness and impartiality, however, has been seen
as implicit in the concept of a jury. Compare Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
with Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). In Batson, the Court
located in the Fourteenth Amendment three pertinent bases for disallowing racially-based
peremptories: (1) the right of the defendant "to be tried by a jury whose members are
selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria"; (2) the right of a member of the
community not to be assumed incompetent for and be excluded from jury service on
account of his race; and (3) the need to preserve "public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice." Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87; see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 'U.S.
522, 530-31 (stating- that representative charter of the jury must be maintained to
guarantee "diffused impartiality"; participation is critical to public confidence). The
Supreme Court has extended the Batson rule to gender-based peremptory challenges in
J.E.B. v. T.B., 1994 WL 132232 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1994); see also Pemberthy v. Beyer, Nos.
92-5633, 92-5641, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 4603 (3d Cir. 1994) (equal protection doesnot
prohibit trial attorney from peremptorily challenging potential jurors because of Spanish-
speaking ability despite correlation between Spanish-speaking and Latino ancestry).
314 See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). In the federal system, Congress has
established the qualifications for jury service and the procedures for selection, requiring
each district to adopt a plan for locating and summoning eligible jurors to the court. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1863-1865 (1982). The plan must implement statutory policies of random
juror selection from a fair cross-section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
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by an impartial jury which suggests that representativeness is of some
concern. 375 In cases where impartiality of the jury has been questioned in
the context of a criminal prosecution, the Court has said that the Sixth
Amendment requires a "fair and undistorted chance" that the petit jury
"represent a fair cross-section of the community ...[but] not that the
possibility will ripen into actuality. ' 3
76
In a few Supreme Court cases and decisions by some state courts,377
the cross-sectionality of venire members has been a concern. The Sixth
315 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 362 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530;
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157
(1968).
Taylor has been interpreted as implying that "the rationale behind [the] representative
cross-section rule suggests that an impartial jury is one in which group biases have the
opportunity to interact." Comment, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation
of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1733 (1977). This approach has been
criticized by some commentators. See, e.g., James M. Druff, Note, The Cross-section
Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1585 (1985).
In Batson, the Court observed:
[T]hough the Sixth Amendment guarantees that the petit jury will be selected from
a pool of names representing a cross section of the community, Taylor v. Louisiana
.... ,we have never held that the Sixth Amendment requires that "petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population." . . .Indeed, it would be impossible to apply a concept
of proportional representation to the petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature
of our society. Such impossibility is illustrated by the Court's holding that a jury
of six persons is not unconstitutional.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.6.
376 McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1128-29 (1984). In Duren, 439 U.S. at 357, the
Court said that at the venire member selection stage-in contrast with the petit jury
selection stage-the representation of "cognizable groups" is required to be "fair and
reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community." Id. at 364. This
requirement is concerned with the recognized constitutional requirement of randomness
which is designed to prevent a systematic scheme leaving the defendant vulnerable to the
state. In Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), the Court stated that by compromising the
representative quality of the jury, discriminatory selection procedures "make juries ready
weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by' chance are numbered
among unpopular or inarticulate minorities." Id. at 408. Yet the Court concluded, "The
number of our races and nationalities stands in the way of evolution of such a
conception" of a right to have the petit jury be composed in whole or in part of persons
of his own race pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; see Batson, 476 U.S. at 85
& n.6 (1986) (stating that the Sixth Amendment guarantees petit jury will be selected
from a pool of names representing a cross-section but not that petit jury "actually chosen
must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population")
(citing Taylor 419 U.S. at 538).
311 See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522; Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); United
States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.
1972); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
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Amendment, however, has not been read to require any action to assure
that the representative character of the venire is carried over to the petit
jury; the Constitution has been read as simply prohibiting the systematic
elimination of the possibility of such a carry-over.378 Similarly, neither the
fourteenth amendment equal protection right of the criminal defendant, the
civil litigant, nor the citizen's interest 379 in participating in the administra-
tion of justice recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment, has led the Court
primarily to value representativeness at either the venire member selection
stage or the voir dire stage, except as a means of achieving impartiality.38°
And even that aspiration has been compromised at the voir dire
stage.38'
31' Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 n.6; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 209 n.5 (1966).
Not even a challenge based on group affiliation would compromise fairness since all
groups are subject to similar challenge. Id. at 221. Only when it can be shown that the
peremptories are used to a group's disadvantage over a significant period of time will a
particular discrepancy be held to reflect a systematic flaw and therefore be considered
impermissible. Id. at 224. The effect of Swain 's standard is that to show a denial of right
and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice, a challenger must show that
peremptory challenges have disqualified a cognizable group in case after case; virtually
no cases were successful in mounting the requisite proof of systemic discrimination and
surviving a response by the challenged respondent. See McCray, 750 F.2d at 1120 n.2
(citing examples of the courts refusing to acknowledge improprieties in government use
of peremptory challenges to remove large numbers of black jurors).
"9 See Kiff, 407 U.S. at 493 (allowing defendant to bring a fourteenth amendment
action to protest exclusion of any cognizable group in selection procedures).
380 See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982) ("[L]itigants ... have the right to . . . petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community .... "). Most of the cases
dealing with the "fair cross section requirement" arise in the criminal context. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (recognizing that a defendant's right to a jury
reflecting general demographic patterns was extended in Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522, in which
the Supreme Court declared that a defendant has a fundamental interest to have present
in venires, panels, or lists from which petit juries are drawn, a fair cross-section of the
community); see also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (reversing conviction
where all-male jury reflected systematic exclusion of women); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 85-86 (1942) (stating that jury cannot be an organ of any special group or
class); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (holding that state policy systematically
excluding blacks from jury service violates equal protection of Fourteenth Amendment
because the resulting jury is not a body truly representative of the community).
381 See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945) (reasoning that "[t]he number of
our races and nationalities stands in the way of evolution of such a conception" of the
demand of equal protection); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)
(recognizing that a defendant has no right to a "petit jury composed in whole or in part
of persons of his own race"). The Court has concluded that the defendant has a right to
be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321 (1906); Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880)). But even in the cases that have relaxed the proof
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Batson v. Kentucky382 loosened the requirements of proof of a
systematic elimination of a "cognizable group ' 383 necessary in a four-
teenth amendment challenge of a prosecutor's use of peremptories. In
Batson, neither cross-sectionality nor even petit jury impartiality was
characterized as a fundamental value. Rather, the harm to the jurors and
the larger community flowing from the use of peremptory challenges
targeting blacks was that a person's race simply "is unrelated to his
fitness as a juror,' 3 84 and purposeful exclusion of blacks "undermine[s]
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice." '385
The significance of this reluctance to speak in terms of cross-
sectionality or representativeness may be underscored by the fact that the
Court in Batson chose to reconsider Swain v. Alabama,386 a fourteenth
amendment case, rather than to rely on the sixth amendment arguments
briefed by the Batson parties in the challenge of racially focused
peremptories. 387 The Court based its ruling on the necessity of eradicating
purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the jury and concluded
required to show that peremptory challenges are discriminatory and therefore violate equal
protection, the courts have reaffirmed that the prosecutor or party litigant can respond to
a challenge of his peremptory exercise with non racial-based reasons for the challenge.
See Druff, supra note 375 (noting a preference for peremptory challenges due to
procedural heritage reflected in mere requirement that prosecutor offer any race-neutral
ground). See Pemberthy v. Beyer, Nos. 92-5633, 92-5641, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 4603 (3d
Cir. 1994). Refusing the challenge in a habeas proceeding, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals nevertheless provided some guidelines for trial courts to consider whether the
requisite "race-neutral" ground for excluding Spanish language speakers exists. Id.
382 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
383 A cognizable group, according to the Supreme Court, can be one singled out for
distinctive treatment in the past, Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961), or one which
"displays distinctive qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience," or
has unique perspective on events. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972). YOUNG, supra
note 15, at 29 (noting that in a participatory democracy, social and racial groups
can be distinguished from interest groups).
384 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111
S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (condemning race stereotypes); Cf. YOUNG, supra note 15, at 156-91
(defining the need for acknowledging differences and social and racial group identities);
Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1072-1195 (comparing strategies of colorblindness and
color-consciousness in a color-conscious world).
385 Batson, 476 U.S at 87.
386 380 U.S. 202 (1966).
387 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 109 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 112 (Burger &
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). But see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (Sixth
Amendment did not restrict the exclusion of a racial group at the peremptory challenge
stage); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (deciding that a racial exclusion challenge
could be made on equal protection grounds).
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that a racially motivated challenge of a venire member violated a
defendant's right to equal protection because it denied him the protection
that a trial by jury is intended to secure. 388 For the criminal defendant, the
Batson Court said that the protection the Constitution secures is to have a
venire "indifferently chosen, ' 38 9 and free of racially motivated arbitrary
exercise of power by the prosecutor and judge.39°
A concept of representative participation of citizens is only weakly
reflected in Batson through the reaffirmation of a randomness requirement
at the venire membership selection stage; at the petit jury selection stage,
however, randomness remains susceptible to compromise, subject to the
discretion of the judge.39' Yet, as Justice Marshall observed in his
concurrence in Batson, arbitrary striking of venire members through
peremptories offends the interest in diversity in the jury.392 It seems
somewhat ironic that in its effort to respond to the "principle of
governmental non-oppression" which Justice White identified in Duncan
v. Louisiana393 as underlying the right to trial by jury, the Court decided
to preserve most peremptory challenges and to increase judicial control
over the jury composition.394
Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308
(1880): "The very idea of a jury is a body . t . composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors,
fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds.").
389 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *349-50 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 1899)).
NO Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
391 Under the approach in Batson, counsel must offer some race-neutral response to a
peremptory challenge. See id. at 106. (Marshall, J., concurring).
392 Id. at 105 (Marshall, J., concurring). See Conner v. Robinson, 415 N.E.2d 805, 809-
10 (Mass. 1981); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d 526, 536-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(noting cases demonstrating the ability of peremptory challenges to evade anti-race
discriminatory directive); supra note 381.
A preferable approach is to abolish peremptory challenges and to focus on fostering
authentic representation. An individual juror who evidences a predisposition favoring a
party can be excused for cause. Impartiality in the sense of openness to the exchange of
views-though not necessarily indifference-is best otherwise accomplished by assuring that
the venire members authentically represent the society. See Nicholas Blake, The Case for
the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 110, at 140, 154-59 (recounting British
criminal trial experience).
13 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
9 Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that right of trial by jury is "too precious to be left to the whim of
the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary").
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Nor have cases following Batson, including Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,3 95 a civil case challenging a private litigant's use of
peremptories to exclude jurors on account of race,396 moved beyond the
Batson equal protection analysis.397 While the Court has been willing to
reject the use of peremptory challenges for purposeful discrimination in the
petit jury selection stage in a variety of cases, its disposition does not
affirmatively support cross-sectionality or representativeness as a means of
achieving a fair and impartial jury. Even the interest in impartiality is seen
as subject to some accommodation of other procedural customs found
within that system,398 including the common-law tradition of peremptory
challenges. 399 Although impartiality in the sense of unimpeded participation
of diverse citizens in government continues to be part of the rhetoric of
cases,4" decisions reflect greater interest in procedures which ensure
* indifference and detachment of the jurors,4"' than in an ideal of representa-
395 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). The Court rejected the lower court's reasoning en banc that
there was not the requisite state action in a private litigant's use of peremptory challenges,
concluding that "[iff a government confers on a private body the power to choose the
government's employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional
mandate of race-neutrality." Id. at 2085. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(plurality) (stating that the machinery for choosing officials becomes subject to the
Constitution's constraints). The Court made only passing reference to the Seventh
Amendment, noting that the Constitution commits the trial of facts to jury. Edmonson, 111
S. Ct. at 2085.
396 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that equal protection
clause prohibits defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination through exercise
of peremptory challenges); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S 400 (1991) (stating that criminal
defendant may object to race-based exclusion of jurors through exercise of peremptory
challenges whether or not defendant and excluded jurors share same race).
391 See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080 (holding that private litigant in civil case may
not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race because of impropriety
of racial bias in the courtroom); Powers, 499 U.S. at 400 (holding that criminal defendant
regardless of his or her race may object to a prosecutor's race-based exclusion of persons
from the petit jury). In Edmonson, the Court emphasized that "[r]ace discrimination
within the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings
conducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea
of democratic government from becoming a reality." Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087; see
supra note 373.
398 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39 See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]here are
peremptory challenges, and always have been."); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481
(1990); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98-99.
0 See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088.
401 See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936) (stating "mental attitude of
appropriate indifference"); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) ("Trial
by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community
as well as impartial in a specific case.").
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tive citizens participating in the construction of justice."' The Court's
ambivalence about representativeness of juries even when it purports to
focus on impartiality suggests that other interests animate the Court's
disposition. First is the Court's preference for a process-based response to
challenges concerning adjudication rather than identification of principles
or values related to that decision-making alternative.4 °3 Second is the
Court's overriding concern about neutrality or indifference rather than
perspective, 401 in part a product of the color-blind posture which is now
imbedded in fourteenth amendment rhetoric.0 5 There is real skepticism
402 In Holland, 493 U.S. at 477, the majority treated impartiality as the sole end of a
fair cross-section requirement. See Druff, supra note 375 (discussing sixth amendment and
fourteenth amendment criminal guarantees).
In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), the Court held that the systematic exclusion of
any cognizable group is objectionable because it excludes a "perspective on human
events that may have unsuspected importance in a jury's decision." Id. at 503-04. In
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), this conception was cast as a procedural
condition: impartiality of juries-but not jurors-is unobtainable in an unrepresentative
body. Id. at 529 n.7. The Court's rulings on peremptory challenges and the requirement
of impartiality of jurors distorts and sometimes destroys the meaning of the cross-section
principle in the interest of juror impartiality. Id. See Druff, supra note 375, at 1558 n. 11;
cf. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Both sides have peremptory
challenges, and they are sometimes used to assure rather than to prevent a racially diverse
jury."). Compare Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595 (Cal. 1979) (using a dual prong
standard requiring not only that group share a common perspective but that only members
of the group can represent this perspective) with id. at 603 n.1 (Tobriner, J., dissenting)
(majority's exclusion of ex-felons and resident aliens from jury service based on view that
exclusion of a group does not violate Constitution unless it is shown no other group
adequately represents its perspective has no basis).
403 See Druff, supra note 375, at 1592 (discussing the Court's focus on procedural
heritage of adjudication).
4 See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Agreeing with Justice O'Connor's dissent, Justice Thomas found that in light of existing
prejudice, securing the representation of others of the defendant's race may help to
overcome bias, providing defendant with a better chance of a fair trial. Id. at 2360. Some
judges acknowledge the social reality of racial and other group-based subordination but
find undesirable affirmative governmental efforts to address it in a conscious way.
Compare id. at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing the disadvantaged position in
which minorities are placed without the opportunity to use race-based peremptory
challenge of jurors) with Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The difficulty of overcoming effects of past discrimination is as nothing
compared with the difficulty of eradicating from our society the source of those effects
which is the tendency, fatal to a nation such as ours, to classify and judge on the basis
of their skin.").
4" See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088 ("[I]f race stereotypes are the price for
acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the
Constitution .... By the dispassionate analysis which is its special distinction, the law
dispels fears and preconceptions respecting racial attitudes.").
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among the Supreme Court Justices about recognizing racial and social
groups and their dialogic potential. °6 The Court's color-blind approach in
the peremptory challenges cases ultimately undermines the potential crea-
tive capacity of the jury. Preferring to save a common law procedure, the
Court utilizes the indifference rationale which subverts the value of
perspective in the deliberation of the jury. The Court marginalizes the
dialogic enterprise by diminishing the role of cognitive and cultural
differences which is at the heart of a representational model.
A jury model concerned with maximizing the dialogic participation of
citizens would focus on ways of promoting authentic representation of
racial and social groups to increase awareness of difference in the ways
we approach the world. Like the search for witnesses capable of
communicating local knowledge in the early days of the jury, a modem
conception of the jury in a heterogeneous society envisions social and
political equals engaged in the exchange of world views in the process of
There is, of course, already some group-consciousness injected in a system concerned
at the venire level with cross-sectionality. See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359-
60 (1979); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 529 n.7. Whereas Duren requires as a second prong that
a challenger demonstrate that the group excluded is a "cognizable one," the challenges
have been mostly limited to traditional groups like race. See Druff, supra note 375 (noting
Taylor's implication that a representative cross-section standard is designed to foster
representation of difference in juror attitudes or group bias would be difficult to effectuate
particularly at the stage of voir dire since distinguishing a permissible group bias from an
impermissible specific bias is far simpler in theory than in practice).
Critical theorists have critiqued the tendency to seek race neutrality in the face of social
implications of race:
The meaning of race has been grafted onto other central cultural images of progress
so that the transition from . . . race consciousness to race neutrality mirrors
movement from myth to enlightenment, from ignorance to knowledge... and most
importantly, the historical self-understanding of liberal society as representing the
movement from status to individual liberty.
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 774; see also Alan Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review
of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (providing race focus to
explain why decisions do not promote equality).
406 See Comment, The Cross Sectionality Requirement and Jury Impartiality, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1076 ("[T]he allure of color blindness is strong ... [I]t fits with
liberal, individualistic principles that each person should be assessed on individual merits,
not upon the basis of group membership."); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1782 (1977) [hereinafter
Limiting the Peremptory Challenge] ("[I]t is at best simplistic to assume that every petit
juror has a group bias based on immutable characteristics such as race or sex that is
strong enough to affect her vote but weak enough to be swayed by deliberating with other
jurors.").
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deliberation. °7 This can only be accomplished by more aggressively
pursuing a cross-sectional requirement at the venire selection stage but
also can be enhanced by recognizing that group-conscious choices during
that stage and subsequent stages of the selection process may be
necessary.408 A preoccupation with developing a "neutral" selection
process, including a color-blind and gender-neutral focus, not only
devalues the significance of social differences, but it can preclude the
possibility of meaningful exchange and the sharing of decision-making
power.40 9 Other facets of the present system which are at odds with this
representative model will be discussed below.
2. Sources of Jurors
Voter registration lists generally have been accepted by courts as an
adequate juror source except where cognizable groups are inadequately
reflected on the lists. 410 Clearly, voter lists are not complete or represen-
407 See supra note 45 (discussing the lack of representativeness of earlier juries when
the community was more homogeneous); Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 134, at
19.
408 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Challenging cross-sectionality requires a showing that
(1) the excluded group is "distinctive"; (2) its representation is unfair and unreasonable
relative to its representation in the community; *and (3) the discrepancy is the result of
systematic exclusion in the selection process. Id. Whether a group is cognizable can be
defined not only in terms of whether the group historically has been singled out for
distinctive treatment, but also in terms of whether the group has distinctive qualities of
human nature, varieties of human experience, or distinctive perspective on events. See
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 60 (1961); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Ballard v.
United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946) (Douglas, J., stating that the sexes are not
fungible). Cases recognizing different groups include Peters, 407 U.S. at 493 (race);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 522 (1975) (sex); State v. Plenty Horse, 184 N.W.2d
654 (S.D. 1971) (national origin); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223 (1946)
(economic status); and Juarez v. State, 277 S.W. 1091 (Tex. 1925) (religion).
4' Neil Gotunda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, "44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 53-62 (arguing that social subordination of racism is not erased in a color-blind
approach); Aleinikoff, supra note 154, at 1094-95 (stating that whites must appreciate the
partiality of their world view and accord to non-majority groups the same nonreductionist
respect they accord themselves).
410 In the federal system, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1982), provide that district courts
must adopt a plan for locating and summoning to the court eligible prospective jurors, id.
§ 1863, implementing statutory policies of random juror selection from a fair cross-section
of the community, id. § 1861, and the non-exclusion on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or economic status. Id. § 1862. The statute details that voter lists are
to be used as a source of participants, id. §§ 1863(b)(2), 1869(c), and states that
supplementation of the voter registration list is required when the lists deviate substantially
from the community's overall demographic patterns. Id. § 1863(b)(2). See California v.
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tative reflectors of some communities."I Case law, however, does not rec-
ognize a right to have a particular group represented on a venire or petit
jury; case law only recognizes the assurance that no group will systema-
tically be excluded.412 Random quirks of non-representation are not color-
able, though for some groups the random selection of the venire, in con-
junction with underrepresentation on source lists and exemptions and
excuses permitted by the courts, leaves little likelihood of authentic
representation.
A challenge must demonstrate that a venire composition used a
systematic procedure to exclude candidates-i.e., not a "random quirk.
' 413
Generally this means a challenger must not only uncover a significant
underrepresentation in one instance but in a number of venires to succeed.
It can thus be argued that a cross-sectional venire here, too, is compro-
mised by a judicial desire for "procedural detachment." An approach
which leaves unaddressed underrepresentation is likely to undermine public
confidence in the fairness of the process and is at odds with a representa-
tional model.414 Though perhaps administratively inconvenient4 5 the
Harris, 679 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984); Duren, 439 U.S. at
365 n.23.
411 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 53-54 (1986);
David Kairys et al., Jury Representativeness: A Mandate ffbr Multiple Source Lists, 65
CAL. L. REV. 776, 805 (1977) (researchers have found that voting lists are not a cross-
section of the community because they are drawn from mainly middle and upper income
population groups). It can be argued that peremptory challenges are one way to respond
to the problem that jury selection procedures do not produce a cross-section of the
community representative in race and sex. The race-neutral posture of cases after Batson
can affect this strategic use of group-consciousness to protect representation as likely as
to attack the subordinating or demeaning use of race against minorities. See, e.g., Batson,
476 U.S. at 103-05 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 109 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also
Mark McDonald, Why Few Latinos Serve on Juries: Only 1 in 5 Register to Vote, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 1990, at 13 (describing gross underrepresentation felt by
community to deprive them of justice in criminal trials); Druff, supra note 375, at 1563
n.41 (noting that the category of people failing to register is not cognizable, according to
courts but often courts confuse the non-cognizability of the non-voting group with other
characteristics which could lead to a conclusion of cognizability).
412 See Taylor, 419 U.S at 538. A fortuitous deviation does not constitute a violation.
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965). In theory the failure to supplement voter
registration lists which deviate from a community's overall demographic patterns can
amount to a systematic exclusion. See Druff, supra note 375, at 1563 n.42 (noting that
few cases have resulted in a quashed jury on this ground).
113 See Duren, 439 U.S. at 366; Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir. 1975)
app. at 811 (study by Walter P. Gewin entitled: An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions).
414 See Kai~ys et al., supra note 411.
415 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990) (Scalia, J., reaffirming that the cross-
sectionality requirement of the Sixth Amendment is subject to legitimate state interests;
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relative ease of supplementing voter registration lists with other sources of
citizens names, such as drivers license lists or school rolls, would suggest
that concrete means exist to foster inclusion of underrepresented groups.
3. Voir Dire
In the federal system and many state systems, the trial judge exercises
substantial control over voir dire.4 16 It is the judge who determines the
range of information that may be discovered about a member of the venire,
and thus the judge has great influence over challenges for cause as well as
peremptory challenges. 41 '7 As importantly, the judge has the capacity
through this power to ensure that "a relation, if not a bond of trust, with
the jurors is established. ' 418 The Supreme Court in the peremptory
challenge cases has expressed concern about the invidious way exclusion
of a juror on the basis of race severs that relation of trust,419 mindful of the
possibility of transforming juror detachment into bias. I have suggested,
however, that a court's preoccupation with juror detachment can result in
the devaluation of the deliberative and dialogic value of the representative
jury. I would argue that voir dire-literally "truth talk"-should include
an opportunity for lawyers and judges to sensitize jurors about differences
among decision-makers and about the social context of the case. The
purpose is to affirmatively encourage a communicative environment.
administrative inconvenience or cost thus may affect a decision to supplement the jury
source); see Druff, supra note 375, at 1582-85; see also McDonald, supra note 411, at 13.
Resistance to using supplemental juror source lists may reflect bias on the part of
administrators against recognizing a jury right to a social or racial group whose members
demonstrate a lack of civic interest by failing to qualify or maintain qualifications for
voting. Cf. Druff, supra note 375, at 1563 n.41 (discussing problem of confusing social
groups' characteristics with non-voting characteristic for purpose of determining
cognizability). In Philadelphia, where the representation on venire is minimal, reflecting
the fact that only one in five Latinos vote, the Jury Commissioner rejected the proposal
to use driver's license information, saying, "We don't need more names.... And in all
my years I've never heard Spanish people say there's a problem here." McDonald, supra
note 411, at 13 (gross underrepresentation of Latinos in jury selection in Philadelphia).
416 See FED. R. Civ. P. 47; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct.
2077 (1991) (finding the state action requirement satisfied in part because of judicial role
at voir dire).
"' As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Edmonson, by overseeing the exclusion of
jurors for cause, the trial judge influences which jurors remain eligible for peremptory
challenges. Edmonson, Ill S.Ct. at 2084. Additionally, in cases involving multiple parties,
the trial judge decides how peremptory' challenges are allocated among the litigants. Id.;
see supra note 381.
418 Id. at 2087 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413 (1991)).
419 E.g., id. at 2088.
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As was discussed above, a representative jury model favors the
abolition of peremptory challenges because peremptory challenges distort
the cross-sectionality objective. 420 The color-blind reasoning for dis-
tinguishing race-based peremptory challenges from others, focusing on jury
detachment and indifference, marginalizes the communicative effort.
I would promote voir dire to preserve the cross-sectionality potential
of the venire. Because "seats alone do not enfranchise, ' 421 a challenge
for cause should be able to be lodged where there is demonstrable
prejudice which would likely render the venire member incapable of
engaging in the deliberation of the case and reaching judgement. Such a
participant would impair the participatory focus of the representative
model. A challenge for cause under a demonstrable prejudice standard
would also be reviewable.422 It is distinguishable from social or racial
affiliation or sense of predisposition.423 A conclusion about a challenge for
cause should consider the communicative and deliberative goals of the
representative model.424
B. Communication Among Decision-Making Participants
I have argued that a preoccupation with fostering a "neutral" and
detached process of decision-making can subvert the interest of creative,
deliberative dialogue and undermine respect for difference upon which
420 Presently, peremptory challenges are provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982), and
federal court. Peremptory challenges, however, are not self-executing, a factor that was
used in support of the Court's conclusion that the state action requirement is met in the
use of racially focused peremptories in the civil context. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at
2077. The Supreme Court has recognized that peremptory challenges may be withheld
altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of the impartial jury and a fair
trial. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992) (citing Frazier v. United States,
335 U.S. 497 (1948) and United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936)). But see Ross v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (stating that peremptories are useful to cure erroneous
refusals by the trial court to excuse potential jurors for cause); supra notes 382-409 and
accompanying text.
421 Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 16, at 1416.
422 See Druff, supra note 375, at 1592 (advocating maximizing meaningful review of
challenges).
423 See e.g., Edmond Costantini et al., Gender and Juror Partiality: Are Women More
Likely to Prejudge Guilt?, 67 JUDICATURE 120, 123 n.6, 126-27 (1983-84) (noting that
women show greater propensity to prejudge but it need not ultimately affect their
decision; for example, jury's deliberative process tends to impact differently on men than
women).
424 See Limiting the Peremptory Challenge, supra note 406, at 1733 (arguing that the
representation of differences in attitudes is precisely what representative cross-sectional
standard elaborated in Taylor is designed to foster).
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political and social equality can be built. I have suggested that it is neces-
sary for judges to encourage a communicative role in voir dire as well as
other stages of the proceedings.4 5 A representative model favors in-
teraction of the decision-making participants as a means of exposing com-
peting world views. This interaction has self-defining as well as larger
social significance. 426 The value of meaningful communication can be
reflected in two contexts: (1) the potential for increased interaction among
the judge and lawyers; and (2) the potential for exchange among the
jurors.
1. Interaction Among Judge, Lawyers, and Jurors
As was acknowledged earlier 4217 juror dissatisfaction often relates to the
lack. of a sense of full participation in the decision-making process. Em-
pirical evidence concerned with the effects of implementing procedures
which would engage judges, jurors, and lawyers in a more interactive way
in the trial process is limited428 but does suggest that jury satisfaction with
the process is increased with greater interaction and understanding of the
respective roles.429 Moreover, there is some evidence that increased in-
teraction among participants can prevent preconceptions from affecting
verdicts.43 o
425 Presently, communication aimed at sensitizing jurors to the social context of the
case is not favored because "[j]ustice must not be based on racial sympathy or
animosity." Stanton v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., 718 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding
that the opening statement improperly "reached the question, of plaintiffs' race"). The
court in Astra found objectionable the plaintiffs' lawyer saying:
[W]e were concerned about the effect of having black people come to an area where
there are not many black people and expecting to get justice from a jury which is
mostly white people. We decided to confront this issue and we asked you the
questions this morning [in voir dire], and we were really pleased with the responses
that we got and we think that this is an impartial jury and everyone here has sworn
that they will try this case not on the basis of passions, or prejudice, or economic
basis, but on the basis of facts and the law.
Id. at 578-79.
426 See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text; Aleinikoff, supra note 154.
427 See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
428 See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 170, at 232 (commenting on recent research
conclusions concerning juror note-taking, juror question-asking, and judicial precharge
prior to the presentation of evidence).
429 id.
430 See F. Gerald Kline & Paul H. Jess, Prejudicial Publicity: Its Effect on Law School
Mock Juries, 43 JOURNALISM Q. 113 (1966) (stating that use of extensive voir dire,
particularly strong instructions from trial judge, the court setting good juror images,
effective lawyers, and jury's deliberation process may all prevent preconceptions from
working their way to verdict).
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Because increased interaction among the participants can foster equality
that is necessary for meaningful dialogue and deliberation, further study of
the possibilities seems warranted.4 3 1 A source of concern is the shift in the
process from an adversarial to inquisitorial posture, creating a possible
opportunity for biased decision-making. 32
2. Deliberation Among Jurors
The value of meaningful juror deliberation is at the heart of the
representative model. The creative opportunity lies in the ability of social
and political equals with divergent views to construct truth through the
give and take of the deliberative process. Theoretically, the process of
deliberation is a "process through which biases of individual jurors are
exposed and isolated or controlled.
' 433
A representative model favors the greatest amount of diversity to meet
the goals of this process. The argument is that notwithstanding the identity
of the litigants, society-and other jurors-can be deprived of the influence
of jurors who reflect a particular perspective or world-view and who are
absent from deliberation. A litigant who does have a similar social identity
is deprived of the influence and knowledge of that missing segment which
can most empathize with and understand her during the deliberative
process.
What is not fully appreciated without further study empirically or in
the effectuation of a representative model is whether bias which blunts
meaningful deliberation because participants are not equally able to
influence decision-making can be tempered. This representative model
values perspective but assumes that there is human capacity for consensus
and discursive agreement among disparate communities, assumptions
which have been theoretically but not empirically founded. 34 What is clear
is that jury deliberation requires sustained communication among social
equals who are respectful of each other and confident of support of allies.
431 See, e.g., Michael A. McLaughlin, Questions to Witnesses and Notetaking by the
Jury as Aids in Understanding Complex Litigation, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 687, 697-98
(1982), quoted in Heuer & Penrod, supra note 170, at 237 ("[Rlather than an indifferent
battle of legal minds with jurors as mere spectators, a trial is above all a search for truth
... while justice is blind, jurors need not also be.").
432 Proponents of the adversarial process contend that it produces fairer and more
accurate decisions than does inquisitorial investigation. John Thibaut et al., supra note
180, at 401 (stating that an experiment lends support to proposition that adversary
presentation can counteract bias). Critics respond that the adversary system promotes
gamesmanship rather than truth. See FRANK, supra note 3, at 90-102.
433 JOINER, JUSTICE AND THE JURY, supra note 2, at 26-27.
434 See supra note 361 for a discussion of some research.
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The present jury model does not fully take account of these charac-
teristics.435
C. Deliberative Accountability
A reconception of the jury, focused on expressing rather than
submerging difference, depends to a great extent on the willingness of
participants to engage in meaningful deliberation aimed at achieving social
justice. I have argued that authentic representation of citizens in the jury
process can promote justice in decision-making.436 Ensuring the opportunity
for expression rather than submergence or assimilation of views can make
more meaningful deliberation. Deliberation, itself, is designed to promote
435 Much is known about the communicative environment of small groups that would
suggest that a representative model could eliminate some of the danger of self-interest,
parochialism, and prejudice. For example, empirical study suggests that for a minority
perspective to be valued-that is, able to influence a deliberative body-the minority group
member needs allies from the outset of deliberation. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra
note 361, at 197; KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 463. To effectuate meaningful
deliberation the representative model would require more than mere token representation.
See also Rosabeth Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios
and Responses to Token Women, 82 AM. J. Soc. 965 (1977) (stating that token women
are entrapped in socially-defined roles); B. Beckman & Harriet Aronson, Selection of Jury
Foremen as a Measure of the Social Status of Women, 43 PSYCHOL. REP. 475 (1978)
(stating that women are more deferential than men in jury deliberation).
According to results of small group decision-making research, unanimous juries of 12
rather than six are potentially more effective at creating an opportunity for dialogue,
including those with minority viewpoints, and achieving consensus. Hans Zeisel .... And
Then There Were None: The Dimunition of the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710
(1971); see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102-03 (1970) (holding that jury of six
persons is not unconstitutional). In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court
acknowledged that the sixth amendment guarantees could not contemplate a "concept of
proportional representation" to the petit jury as illustrated by the Court's holding in
Williams. Id. at 85 n.6.
It is certainly doubtful, given the present efficiency-prone, color-blind, and gender-
neutral judicial posture, that such steps to effectuate meaningful deliberation would be
taken. See supra note 361; YOUNG, supra note 15, at 187 (stating that group rep-
resentation of group experiences, perspectives, and interests is sometimes more, sometimes
less than proportional representation); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105-08 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (noting the problem of confronting one's own racism and prejudice in addressing
the claims of others).
436 See YOUNG, supra note 15, at 184-87 (arguing that group representation, distin-
guished from interest group representation: (a) better assures procedural fairness in setting
the agenda and hearing opinions; (b) assures a voice for the oppressed and the privileged;
(c) encourages expression of individual and group needs; and (d) promotes just outcomes
because it maximizes social knowledge). Id.; see supra notes 370-424 and accompanying
text.
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justice, as contrasted with self-interested decision-making, which does not
require the justification of positions by claimants, though it is dependent
on sustained discussion of equals.437 In addition there are other possibilities
for holding community representatives more accountable for their actions
as citizen representatives. 438 Through interaction with the jury, as described
above, judges and lawyers can ensure that the jury confronts its own
decision-making responsibility.439 In some circumstances, this alternative
is subverted because citizens are not made to understand the results of
deliberation by focusing on the human connections of the case.44°
Finally, normative principles can ultimately determine whether jury
decision-making is the product of prejudice outside the boundaries of
justice. A normative principle of color-blindness or gender-neutrality does
little to promote justice. A reconceptualization of the civil jury, promoting
citizen participation, must take account of differences in a realistic, and I
would argue, a constructive way. It entails, however, a rethinking of our
concept of equality.
437 See, e.g., Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 337; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) (contrasting liberal
politics of self-interest from liberal republican model of discourse).
438 Resnik, supra note 154, at 1929; see, e.g., M.H. Hoeflich & Jon G. Deutsch,
Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749, 750 (1978);
Subrin, supra note 20, at 999 (noting that the abstraction of document-driven litigation
contrasts with trial's "spontaneous story").
419 Sherry, supra note 14, at 611 (recognizing responsible decision-making as a virtue
in itself and as relational; an aware jury is in a position to be merciful and compassionate
and not simply to enforce rights but to understand their duty to act in a just manner); see,
e.g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 342-43 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (invalidating statute concerning
precluding family background and personal history considerations as mitigating
circumstances in defendant's conviction); see also West, supra note 14, at 85-93
(discussing judicial influence on juries).
This notion of accountability through interaction extends to the judge as well as to the
jurors. "I want my judges to have the experience of explanation before another who
holds power .... I want the dialogic experience to inform us about what qualities lead us
to unfair judgment." Resnik, supra note 154, at 1935. See Subrin, supra note 20, at 999
(discussing "counterforce of several lay people to the single, powerful, trial judge"); cf.
Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 12, at 36 (noting that personal liberty laws in response to
fugitive slave laws of some free states involved juries, providing for fact-finding as to
whether the person was the runaway; court decisions like Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
539 (1842), narrowed this option).
440 See supra notes 374-82 and accompanying text (describing dispassionate justice).
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